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ARTICLES 
OF GOD AND CAESAR: THE FREE 
EXERCISE RIGHTS OF PUBLIC 
SCHOOL STUDENTS 
George W. Dent, Jr.* 
Then saith [Jesus] unto them, Render therefore unto Caesar 
the things which are Caesar's; and unto God the things that 
are God's.' 
When the Pharisees tried to "entangle" Jesus by asking "Is it 
lawful to give tribute unto Caesar, or not," He avoided the trap by 
distinguishing the sacred from the secular.2 When Caesar imposes 
on children an education that offends their belief in God, however, 
it may be impossible to satisfy both injunctions. Many religious 
people today feel that government is hostile to their religion, espe-
cially in the public schools. They seek relief from classes that 
offend their faith so that they can "[r]ender ... unto God the 
things that are God's" without disobeying Caesar. Schools often 
grant these requests voluntarily. When there is litigation, the results 
are mixed, but parents win often enough to suggest that there are 
some free exercise rights in these situations. 
I will briefly describe these controversies and then analyze the 
impact of recent Supreme Court decisions on these issues and sug-
* Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University School of Law. 
1. Matthew: 22:21. 
2. /d. at 22:15-22. 
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gest how they should be resolved. 
I. BACKGROUND: TYPICAL RELIGIOUS COMPLAINTS ABOUT 
SCHOOL INSTRUCTION 
Most religious objections to public education come from reli-
gious traditionalists-primarily fundamentalist Protestants, but also 
traditional Catholics, Orthodox Jews, and smaller sects. The objec-
tions vary.3 Some would seem strange, even incomprehensible to 
most Americans, but others are intelligible and more appealing to 
the mainstream. One study of several widely used textbooks4 
found that "[p]atriotism is close to nonexistent"5 and the role of 
business in American life is "ignored. "6 Traditional family values 
and sex roles are slighted: The family is defined as just "a group 
of people,"7 marriage is ignored,8 and divorce is pronounced ac-
ceptable or "a neutral event. "9 The one-parent family is 
condoned. 10 Women are never portrayed as homemakers, and 
motherhood and marriage are rarely depicted positively-the words 
"marriage," "wedding," "husband" and "wife" were not mentioned 
once in sixty social studies textbooks surveyed. 11 
The teaching of ethics also draws protest. Many public schools 
preach a moral relativism that rejects any notion of enduring val-
ues. 12 Self-actualization is treated as the highest goal. 13 Sex edu-
cation, including instruction about AIDS, is a fertile source of trou-
ble. Parents have objected to a pamphlet that advised "'use latex 
3. See generally George W. Dent, Jr., Religious Children, Secular Schools, 61 S. CAL. 
L. REV. 863, 865-73 (1988). 
4. PAUL C. VITZ, CENSORSHIP: EVIDENCE OF BIAS IN OUR CHILDREN'S TEXTBOOKS 
(1986). 
5. Id. at 75 (conclusion as to textbooks used to teach reading). 
6. I d. at 3 (conclusion as to textbooks used to teach reading). 
7. ld. at 37 (quoting FREDERICK M. KING ET AL., UNDERSTANDING FAMILIES 6 
(1983)). 
8. Id. at 38 (discussing the bias found in social studies textbooks). 
9. Smith v. Board of Sch. Comm'rs, 655 F. Supp. 939, 1008 (S.D. Ala.) (quoting 
CONNIE R. SASSE, PERSON TO PERSON 300 (1981)) (addressing whether textbooks used in 
public schools promoted the religion of secular humanism and violated the Establishment 
Clause), rev'd, 827 F.2d 684 (lith Cir. 1987). 
10. See FRANCES B. PARNELL, HOMEMAKING SKIIl..S FOR EVERYDAY LIVING 88 (1984) 
(saying that the one-parent family is not "inferior"). 
11. VITZ, supra note 4, at 2. 
12. See Fred M. Hechlnger, A Matter of Censorship, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 10, 1987, at 
Cll (discussing the controversy over secular humanism in the Smith decision). 
13. See Smith, 655 F. Supp. at 1000 ("Self-actualization is the highest level of human 
need.") (quoting VERDENE RYDER, CONTEMPORARY LIVING 20 (1981)). 
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condoms plus spermicide . . . if you can't be sure your partner is 
not infected with the [AIDS] virus,' and to 'limit the number of 
sexual partners to reduce your chance of exposure to the virus. "' 14 
A curriculum guide for New York City public schools comments 
on masturbation: "Do it, it's fun." 15 
Finally, the historical role of religion is slighted except in its 
relation to non-Western societies and among American minori-
ties. 16 Thus "Protestantism is almost entirely excluded, at least for 
whites."17 For example, the religious motives of the Pilgrims have 
been extirpated/8 and in a story by Isaac Singer, references to 
God were deleted. 19 
Perhaps in theory it should not matter whether these complaints 
are plausible to most Americans-the First Amendment protects 
unusual as well as commonplace religious beliefs. In practice, how-
ever, it does make a difference, as evidenced by an editorial in the 
New York Times that ridiculed certain religious objections as 
"know-nothing-alarmism."20 Obviously, one's view of the plausi-
bility of a complaint influences one's views about its legal validity. 
Public education is often portrayed as value neutral.21 Tradi-
tional religionists reject the idea of value neutral education-they 
want their children educated in the values of their religion. 22 
14. Ware v. Valley Stream High Sch. Dist., 550 N . .£.2d 420, 423 (N.Y. 1989) (quoting 
THE WELLNESS WAY: UNDERSTANDING AND PREVENTING AIDS). 
15. Quoted in Richard Vigilante, Winning in New York, NAT'L REV., Jan. 18, 1993, at 
18. 
16. VITZ, supra note 4, at 16-18 (finding occasional references to Jewish, Mormon, 
and other minority religions and a greater emphasis on religion in other cultures in social 
studies textbooks). 
17. Jd. at 75 (conclusion as to textbooks used to teach reading). See generally ROBERT 
BRYAN, HISTORY, PSEUDO-HiSTORY, ANTI-HISTORY: HoW PuBLIC SCHOOL TExTBOOKS 
TREAT RELIGION (1983) (giving examples of the ignoring of, and distorting of, the role of 
religion in textbooks); William R. Marty, To Favor Neither Religion Nor Nonreligion: 
Schools in a Pluralist Society, in EQUAL SEPARATION 95, 99 (Paul J. Weber ed., 1990) 
("[T]he thrust in the public schools is to treat religion not at all, or as irrelevant, or as 
superstition."). 
18. See VITZ, supra note 4, at 3, 18 (examples in social studies textbooks). 
19. Id. at 3-4 (changes made in a sixth grade reader). See also id. at 79 (attempt by 
publisher to remove religious references from another story). 
20. See Jim and Pat Cook. Jim Cooks First, N.Y. TiMEs, Mar. 13, 1986, at A26. 
21. Rosemary C. Salome, Free Speech and School Governance in the Wake of 
Hazelwood, 26 GA. L. REV. 253, 257 (1992) (asserting that our society has become more 
diverse, challenging the "myth" that public education is value neutral). 
22. Stanley Ingber, Religion or Ideology: A Needed Clarification of the Religion 
Crouse, 41 STAN. L. REV. 233, 234-35 (1989) (asserting that fundamentalists feel threat-
ened by the influence of "secular humanism" in school curriculum). 
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More importantly, education can never be value neutral - inevita-
bly, education promotes some values and belittles others. 23 More-
over, ·in many cases public schools make no effort to be neutral or 
even-handed; it is in these cases that traditional religionists often 
complain. For example, considerable controversy now swirls around 
the treatment of homosexuality in the public schools.24 Although 
many parents would resist a treatment that gave all points of view, 
it is important to note that most disputes have arisen in schools 
that do not pursue even-handedness. Many public schools now 
portray homosexuality as normal and acceptable. 25 These schools 
give children no other side of the issue; they do not mention that 
our main religious traditions (not just fundamentalists) regard ho-
mosexuality as a sin and an abomination in the eyes of God. 26 
Thus, it should be kept in mind that the teaching to which reli-
gious traditionalists object is not value neutral and often does not 
even try to be so. 
II. THE CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW 
The law on the free exercise rights of public school students is 
jumbled. Students are often accommodated without litigation. Many 
state education laws exempt religious objectors from physical edu-
cation, sex and AIDS education, and other instruction.27 Absent 
statutory exemptions, local school districts, principals, or teachers 
may grant them. 28 Sometimes accommodation includes substitute 
instruction. 29 
23. See id. at 238-39 (1989) (arguing that value-free education is impossible for several 
reasons). 
24. See Josh Barbanel, Under "Rainbow, " a War: When Politics, Morals and Learning 
Mix, N.Y. nMEs, Dec. 27, 1992, at 34 (describing the controversy surrounding the "Chil-
dren of the Rainbow" curriculum in New York City); Maria E. Odum, Topic of Homosex-
uality Shows Diversity in Sex Education, WASH. POST, Dec. 27, 1992, at B1 (discussing 
the treatment of the topic of homosexuality in sex education classes in area schools). 
25. See William Celis, III, Schools Across U.S. Cautiously Adding Lessons on Gay 
Life, N.Y. nMEs, Jan. 6, 1993, at A7. 
26. See Sam Roberts, Politics and the Curriculum Fight, N.Y. nMEs, Dec. 15, 1992, 
at B1 (defending the different objections to the Rainbow Curriculum in New York City). 
27. See Ware v. Valley Stream High Sch. Dis!., 550 N.E.2d 420, 422-23 (N.Y. 1989) 
(describing New York laws on religious exemptions in public schools); MARTHA M. Mc-
CARTHY, A DEUCATE BALANCE: CffiJRCH, STATE AND THE SCHOOLS 59-60 (1983) (de-
scribing statutory religious exemptions from sex education classes). 
28. MCCARTHY, supra note 27, at 60 (noting that litigation can arise when school offi-
cials do not grant an exception not provided for by statute or administrative regulation). 
Furthermore, requests for excused absences based on religious reasons are also most often 
handled by the school and do not require litigation. !d. at 69. 
29. See Mozert v. Hawkins County Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 1058, 1073-74 (6th Cir. 
1993] REUG/ON AND THE PUBUC SCHOOLS 711 
When accommodation is denied, some parents sue. Reported 
opinions in these cases are few and the results are inconsistent. 
Parents usually (though not always) win an exemption from offen-
sive instruction, but rarely gain any further relier_3° 
ill. FREE EXERCISE IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS: THE IMPACT OF 
RECENT SUPREME COURT DECISIONS 
After Wisconsin v. Yoder,31 the standard for free exercise 
claims seemed clear:. a government act that substantially infringes a 
sincerely held religious belief is unconstitutional unless justified by 
a compelling state interest pursued by the least restrictive means.3~ 
Unfortunately, that standard was called into question by Em-
1987) (suit ensued when school stopped giVIng children alternative texts), cert. denied, 
484 U.S. 1066 (1988); Grove v. Mead Sch. Dist., 753 F.2d 1528, 1533 (9th Cir.) (school 
excused child from a class using religiously offensive book and assigned child an alterna-
tive book), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 826 (1985). 
30. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (A.rnish children granted exemption 
from attending school past eighth grade); Spence v. Bailey, 465 F.2d 797 (6th Cir. 1972) 
(exemption granted from participation in ROTC); Church of God v. Amarillo Indep. Sch. 
Dist., 511 F. Supp. 613 (N.D. Tex. 1981) (school policy limiting absences for religious 
holidays violated free exercise), aff'd, 670 F.2d 46 (5th Cir. 1982); Moody v. Cronin, 484 
F. Supp. 270 (C.D. Ill. 1979) (exemption granted from coeducational physical education 
classes); Wright v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 366 F. Supp. 1208, 1211-12 & n.7 (S.D. 
Tex. 1972) (child excused from classes on evolution; the state educational code provided 
exemption for students from classes where subject matter conflicts with religious beliefs), 
aff'd per curiam, 486 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 969 (1974). Cf 
Grove v. Mead Sch. Dist., 753 F.2d 1528, 1533 (9th Cir.) (further relief denied where 
school excused child from class using religiously offensive book and assigned child an 
alternative book), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 826 (1985); Menora v. Illinois High Sch. Ass'n, 
683 F.2d 1030 (7th Cir. 1982) (case remanded for determination of whether plaintiffs' 
religious obligation to wear yarmulkes could be accommodated while still meeting safety 
concerns underlying rule against basketball players wearing headgear that might fall off), 
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1156 (1983); Davis v. Page, 385 F. Supp. 395, 406 (D.N.H. 1974) 
(child exempted from audio-visual programs intended for entertainment, but not those 
intended for education, and not from health education program); Ware v. Valley Stream 
High Sch. Dist., 550 N.E.2d 420 (N.Y. 1989) (suit remanded for determination of burden 
on plaintiffs' religious exercise and whether state had compelling interest in requiring 
AIDS education). But see Mozert v. Hawkins County Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 1058 (6th 
Cir. 1987) (all relief denied), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1066 (1988); Keller v. Gardner Com-
munity Consol. Grade Sch. Dist., 552 F. Supp. 512 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (school athlete denied 
exemption for missing practice to take Catholic catechism which he could have taken on 
another day). 
31. 406 u.s. 205 (1972). 
32. See Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680, 699 (1989) (holding that contri-
butions for church training courses are not deductible as charitable contributions under § 
170 of the Internal Revenue Code); JoHN E. NOWAK ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1068-
69 (3d ed. 1986) (stating the balancing test used by the Court to determine whether an 
exemption can be granted from a law burdening a religious practice). 
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ployment Division v. Smith,33 where the Supreme Court held that 
the Free Exercise Clause did not exempt religious use of peyote by 
American Indians from a state antidrug law.34 More importantly, 
without warning, and without the parties' having raised or argued 
the issue, Employment Division v. Smith announced a new standard 
of free exercise jurisprudence that distinguishes between belief and 
conduct: 
[T]he First Amendment obviously excludes all "governmen-
tal regulation of religious beliefs as such." The government 
may not compel affirmation of religious belief, punish the 
expression of religious doctrines it believes to be false, im:.. 
pose special disabilities on the basis of religious views or 
religious status, or lend its power to one or the other side 
in controversies over religious authority or dogma.35 
[But] the right of free exercise does not relieve an indi-
vidual of the obligation to comply with a "valid and neu-
tral law of general applicability on the ground that the law 
proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion pre-
scribes (or proscribes)."36 
Most commentators treated this statement as the death knell of 
free exercise.37 They reasoned that government rarely controls ex-
pression of religious belief;38 laws limiting religious freedom al-
most always regulate conduct, which Employment Division v. Smith 
permits.39 Thus, even such venerable practices as the use of wine 
in the Eucharist or the Passover seder could be forbidden so long 
33. 494 u.s. 872 (1990). 
34. !d. at 890. 
35. Id at 877 (quoting Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 402 (1963)). 
36. !d. at 879 (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982)). 
37. See, e.g., Ira C. Lupu, The Trouble with Accommodation, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
743, 755-59 (1992). Lupu refers to Employme/lt Division v. Smith as having "closed the 
modern era of free exercise adjudication." Id at 757. See also Michael W. McConnell, 
Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U. Cm. L. REV. ll09, ll44-45 
(1990) (criticizing the Employment Division v. Smith decision for "eliminating the doctrine 
of free exercise exemptions 'instead or contributing to the development of a more princi-
pled approach"). 
38. McConnell, supra note 37, at ll45 (asserting that the history of permissible gov-
ernment intervention into religious exercise extends only to instances needed to protect the 
public or children). 
39. Employme/lt Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. at 878-79 ("We have never held that an 
individual's religious beliefs excuse him from compliance with an otherwise valid law 
prohibiting conduct that the State is free to regulate."). 
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as the prohibition were general.40 
Although the standard announced in Employment Division v. 
Smith is distressing, it does not necessarily doom free exercise 
claims by public school students. First, although attendance and 
participation in school are conduct, they involve belief in ways that 
most activities do not. The most common religious objection to 
public schooling is that it subjects students to indoctrination hostile 
to their faith.41 In some situations students are even compelled or 
forbidden to express beliefs. Such a situation occurs when students 
who believe the Biblical account of creation are required to treat 
evolution as true.42 In this type of case government directly "com-
pel[s] affirmation" or "punish[es] the expression of religious doc-
trines," which Employment Division v. Smith forbids.43 
Usually indoctrination is less blunt. For instance, a more sub-
tle indoctrination occurs where stories or discussions portray homo-
sexuality or illegitimacy as normal and acceptable. This could be 
forbidden by Employment Division v. Smith as "lend[ing 
government's] power to one or the other side in controversies over 
religious authority or dogma."44 Moreover, the impact of govern-
ment indoctrination is likely to be greater when its objects are 
impressionable children.45 Thus school instruction could also be 
40. Michael McConnell lists several commonly accepted activities that might be for-
bidden if Employment Division v. Smith were so construed. McConnell, supra note 37, at 
1142-43 (examples include requiring the Catholic Church to hire female priests, no longer 
requiring prisons to observe dietary laws of Jewish or Muslim inmates, and desegregating 
the sexes at Orthodox Jewish services). 
41. See Ingber, supra note 22, at 235-37. Ingber discusses Mozer! v. Hawkins County 
Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1066 (1988); Smith 
v. Board of Sch. Comm'rs, 655 F. Supp. 939 (S.D. Ala.), rev'd, 827 F.2d 684 (11th Cir. 
1987); and Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987), and concludes that "'the recurring 
underlying theme was the fear held by some that public education might influence or 
even "indoctrinate' children in directions contrary to fundamental religious perspectives."' 
Ingber, supra note 22, at 237. -
42. The Louisiana statute that required equal treatment for creationism if evolution 
were taught in a public school, which was struck down by the Supreme Court in Ed-
wards, 482 U.S. at 593, was triggered by such an event. A legislator's son recited in 
school that "'God created the World, and God created man." The teacher graded this an-
swer "'unsatisfactory." See Alan Freeman & Betty Mensch, Religion as SciencejScience as 
Religion: Constitutional Law and the Fundamentalist Challenge, 2 TIKKUN 64, 64-65 
(1987). 
43. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990). 
44. /d. 
45. The Weisman Court also makes this distinction between children and adults as to 
the impact of government indoctrination. Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2658 (1992) 
(noting that a particular danger of coercion exists with prayer at public schools). The 
Court further makes this point by differentiating prayer at a graduation ceremony from the 
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deemed "governmental regulation of religious beliefs as such. "46 
On these grounds alone, Employment Division v. Smith might vali-
date some free exercise claims of public school children. 
Second, Employment Division v. Smith states that the First 
Amendment sometimes 
bars application of a neutral, generally applicable law to 
religiously motivated action [that] involved not the Free 
Exercise Clause alone, but the Free Exercise Clause in con-
junction with other constitutional protections, such as . . . 
the right of parents, acknowledged in Pierce v. Society of 
Sisters . . . to direct the education of their children, see 
Wisconsin v. Yoder .... 47 
The specific citation of public school cases shows that Employ-
.... ment Division v. "smith does not preclude free exercise claims by 
students.~ Pierce recognized a constitutional right to send one's chil-
dren to private rather than public schools.48 Yoder upheld a right 
of parents to remove their children from school altogether after the 
eighth grade.49 However, that decision applied only to the Amish 
sect which, the Court carefully noted, provides its children effective 
vocational training.50 Moreover, Yoder and Pierce permit parents 
only to remove children from public schools completely.51 
Total removal may be less problematic than withdrawing chil-
dren from particular classes or demanding alternative instruction, as 
situation in Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 782 (1983), where prayer beginning a 
state legislative session was held not to violate the Establishment Clause because adults 
were involved. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. at 2660-61. See also Developments in the Law -
Religion and the State, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1606, 1659-60 (1987) (asserting that a "para-
mount concern" of the Court in Establishment Clause violations in the public school set-
ting "is the particular vulnerability of school children to indoctrination and coercion"). 
46. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. at 877 (quoting Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 
398, 402 (1963)). 
47. /d. at 872, 881 (citing Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) and Wis-
consin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972)). See also Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 
166 (1944). In Prince, the Court stated, "It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and 
nurture of the child reside first in the parents . . . . " /d. However, the Court upheld a 
statute forbidding children to sell goods on public streets against the parents' claim that 
their faith required the children to sell religious tracts. !d. at 170. 
48. Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534-35 (holding that an Oregon statute requiring that a child 
be sent to public school interferes with the parents' and guardians' right to choose the 
child's education). 
49. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 234. 
50. !d. at 228-29, 234-36. 
51. /d. at 234; Pierce, 268 .U.S. at 234-35. 
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some parents have done.52 Thus Employment Division v. Smith's 
reference to a "right to direct the education of [one's] children"53 
is cryptic. It may be no more than a shorthand for the rights rec-
ognized in Pierce and Yoder; or it may presage broader parents' 
rights, partly under the Free Exercise Clause. 
The more recent decision in Lee v. Weisman54 construes the 
Establishment Clause, but it may also be important to free exercise 
issues. The majority framed the issue there as whether a prayer at 
a public school graduation subjects citizens to compulsion.55 Al-
though a compulsion test might suggest a narrow definition for the 
Establishment Clause, the majority concluded that the prayer did 
exert compulsion because graduates and their families are pressured 
to attend the ceremony and to participate to some extent in the 
prayer.56 
Weisman's result is commendable but its reasoning is dubious. 
It strains the idea of compulsion to say that children and parents 
are compelled to attend commencement at all, and strains it further 
to say that they are compelled to participate in the prayer merely 
by observing the respectful silence that minimal courtesy demands. 
The Court would have done better to forbid the prayer because it 
endorsed religion.57 Nonetheless, the broad definition of compul-
sion is significant, especially because the context is a public school 
graduation. Attendance at graduation is not legally mandated; atten-
dance at regular classes is. Participation in the prayer was not 
required; participation in many other aspects of public schooling is. 
It should follow, then, that virtually all activity in public schools 
involves compulsion.58 
52. See supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text. 
53. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881 (1990). 
54. 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992). 
55. Id. at 2652. 
56. /d. at 2658-59. 
57. Support for a "no endorsement" test has been advanced by Justice O'Connor. For 
a discussion of this test, see Steven D. Smith, Symbols, Perceptions, and Doctrinal Illu-
sions: Establishment Neutrality and the "No Endorsement" Test, 86 MICH. L. REV. 266, 
270-74 (1987) (criticizing the "no endorsement" test as defective and unable to provide 
consistency and clarity to establishment clause doctrine). As recently as Smith the Court 
stated that "[t]he government may not . . . lend its power to one or the other side in 
controversies over religious authority or dogma." Smith, 494 U.S. at 877. 
58. The Court referred to graduation as· "the one school event most important for the 
student to attend," Weisman, 112 S. Ct. at 2660, and "one of life's most significant occa-
sions." ld. at 2559. Presumably this hyperbole has little or no legal relevance. It is doubt-
ful, for example, that the Court would permit similar prayers during daily assemblies on 
the grounds that such assemblies are less "important" or "significant" than graduation. 
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When is compulsion unconstitutional? Weisman says: "The 
design of the Constitution is that preservation and transmission of 
religious beliefs and worship is a responsibility and a choice com-
mitted to the private sphere . . . . [The Religion] Clauses exist to 
protect religion from government interference. "59 Although this 
passage preserves the belief/conduct dichotomy laid down in Em-
ployment Division v. Smith,60 it suggests an expansive definition 
of the scope of belief: not only belief itself, but the "preservation 
and transmission" of beliefs are protected, and the regulation of 
belief that is prohibited encompasses any "government interfer-
ence. "61 Although instruction inconsistent with a child's faith may 
not directly regulate belief, it does seem to interfere with the pres-
ervation and transmission of belief and thus appears to be forbid-
den. 
Employment Division v. Smith is arguably distinguishable from 
the public school cases because this case involved the use of hallu-
cinogens.62 American law has long frowned on the use of these 
drugs, and public concern about drug abuse was especially intense 
when Employment Division v. Smith was decided. Christian and 
Jewish rituals eschew narcotics,63 so the narrow holding of that 
case does not threaten our major religions. By contrast, many large 
sects object to certain practices of the public schools. It is regretta-
ble that the Court was not more sympathetic to the minority reli-
gious practices at issue in Employment Division v. Smith, but that 
insensitivity will not necessarily extend to the claims of more tra-
ditional sects. 64 
The significance of the public school setting is highlighted by 
comparing Marsh v. Chambers,65 which involved prayer in state 
59. /d. at 2656-57. 
60. See supra note 36 and accompanying text. 
61. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. at 2656-57. 
62. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 874 (1990) (ingesting peyote at a Na-
tive American Church ceremony). 
63. The use of wine in Christian and Jewish rl'tuals is too minimal to have a narcotic 
effect. See Douglas Laycock, Formal, Substantive, and Disaggregated Neutrality Toward 
Religion, 39 DEPAUL L. REV. 993, 1003 (1990) (describing the amount of wine consumed 
during a Catholic ceremony as a "tiny nip''). 
64. Cf McConnell, supra note 37, at 1135 (noting that any distinction made between 
wine used in a sacrament and peyote used in a Native American ceremony is "not based 
on any objective differences between the effects of the two substances" but instead is 
based on familiarity and prejudice). 
65. 463 U.S. 783 (1983) (holding that prayer opening state legislative sessions does not 
violate the Establishment Clause). 
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legislative sessions, with Weisman. Weisman dwells upon "protect-
ing freedom of conscience from subtle coercive pressure in the 
elemel\tary and secondary public schools. "66 By contrast, the 
Marsh Court deemed the pressures on adults to participate in a 
legislature's prayers to be much weaker.67 
This distinction helps refute the common argument68 that 
"mere exposure" to ideas hostile to one's religion does not violate 
free exercise. Weisman distinguishes . between free speech claims 
and religion clause claims. The theory of the former is that debate 
should be open and robust. Although government's discretion to 
take sides is limited even in nonreligious debates, it can and often 
must take sides in these disputes. 69 However: 
The method for protecting freedom of worship and freedom 
of conscience in religious matters is quite the reverse. In 
religious debate or expression the government is not a 
prime participant . . . . [T]he Establishment Clause is a 
specific prohibition on forms of state intervention in re-
ligious affairs with no precise counterpart in the speech 
provisions. 70 
Although the Court never states that mere exposure to govern-
ment speech that offends one's religion is invariably unconstitution-
66. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. at 2658. 
67. The Weisman Court stated: 
The atmosphere at the opening of a session of a state legislature where adults 
are free to enter and leave with little conunent and for any number of reasons 
cannot compare with the constraining potential of the one school event most 
important for the student to attend. The influence and force of a formal exer-
cise in a school graduation are far greater than the prayer exercise we con-
doned in Marsh. 
!d. at 2660. 
68. See Mozer! v. Hawkins County Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 1058, 1070 (6th Cir. 1987) 
(holding that requiring students to use the school's reader series does not violate the 
Establishment Clause), cert. detzied, 484 U.S. 1066 (1988); Nadine Strossen, "Secular Hu-
manism" and "Scientific Creationism": Proposed Standards for Reviewing Curricular 
Decisions Affecting Students' Religious Freedom, 47 OHIO ST. L.J. 333, 374-75 (1986) 
(proposing a standard to provide more protection for religious beliefs of public school 
students). 
69. Compare Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 1759 (1991) (government may favor child-
birth over abortion) and Regan v. Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 550-51 
(1983) (government may subsidize some lobbying organizations and not others) and 
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 92-93 (1976) (government may fund some candidates for 
public office and not others) with Arkansas Writers Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 
221, 234 (1987) (invalidating tax that discriminated between magazines on the basis of 
their content because it violated freedom of the press). 
70. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. at 2657-58. 
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al, the Court recognizes that the coercive atmosphere of public 
schools makes "exposure" especially dangerous there.71 Also, the 
Court has held, in Yoder and in Pierce, that compelled exposure to 
religiously offensive teaching can violate the Constitution.72 
Weisman does not decide whether the option of protesting neutral-
izes the offense "if the affected citizens are mature adults, but we 
think the State may not, consistent with the Establishment Clause, 
place primary and secondary school children in this position."73 
This discussion illustrates a second problem that arises when 
students are subjected to doctrine that is offensive to their religion: 
not only may it improperly influence their beliefs, but their very 
presence and respectful silence may be taken as assent to that 
doctrine. This problem feeds on itself. The endorsement of an idea 
by the teacher-a government official and an authority figure-may 
torment a student to whom the idea is religiously offensive. If her 
peers fail to protest, she assumes that they agree with the teacher, 
which makes the student feel like even more of a misfit or pariah. 
Given students' reluctance to dissent,74 this silent torment could 
arise even if most students in fact disagree with the teacher. 
Although Weisman deals with the Establishment Clause, "mere 
exposure" should be treated similarly under the Free Exercise 
Clause. The statement in Weisman that religion is "committed to 
the private sphere,"75 free from "government interference,"76 ap-
plies equally to government actions that denigrate some sect, or 
religion generally, as well as to government actions that endorse 
religion. Indeed, the offense in free exercise cases is often worse 
than the offense in Weisman. In Weisman, the plaintiffs were mere-
71. The Weisma11 Court suggested that a graduation ceremony atmosphere: 
places public pressure, as well as peer pressure, on attending students to . . . , 
at least, maintain respectful silence . . . . This pressure, though subtle and 
indirect, can be as real as any overt compulsion. Of course, in our culture 
standing or remaining silent can signify adherence to a view . . . . [G]iven our 
social conventions, a reasonable dissenter in this milieu could believe that the 
group exercise signified her own participation or approval of it. 
!d. at 2658. 
72. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 231 (1972); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 
u.s. 510, 535 (1925). 
73. Weisma11, 112 S. Ct. at 2658-59. 
74. This reluctance was recognized in Weisma11. There, the Court stated that it was an 
"unacceptable constraint" in violation of the Establishment Clause to impose a choice of 
whether or not to dissent upon children, who are assumably susceptible to peer pressure 
"in matters of social convention." !d. at 2659. 
75. !d. at 2656. 
76. !d. 
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ly expected to maintain respectful silence during the offensive 
prayer.77 In cases like Mozert v. Hawkins County Board of Educa-
tion,78 though, children are expected to pay attention to and ab-
sorb teaching that offends their religion. One can justify a greater 
sensitivity to establishment claims than to free exercise claims only 
if the religion clauses are viewed as promoting secularism. 
Weisman, however, confirms the Supreme Court's frequent asser-
tion that the religion clauses demand governmental neutrality not 
only among different religions, but also between religion and secu-
larism.79 The goal of neutrality dictates equal sensitivity to both 
types of claims.80 
77. /d. at 2653. 
78. Mozert v. Hawkins County Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d !058, 1070 (6th Cir. 1987), 
cer(. denied, 484 U.S. 1066 (1988). 
79. See Weisman, 112 S. Ct. at 2656-57 and supra text accompanying note 71; County 
of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 588 (1989) (indicating that the Establishment 
Clause "prohibits government from appearing to take a position on questions of religious 
belief'); Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 414 (1985) (invoking the constitutional princi-
ples emphasizing that government shall not "promote or hinder a particular faith or faith 
generally"); Grand Rapids Sch. Dis!. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 382 (1985) (slating that the 
government is required "to maintain a course of neutrality among religions, and between 
religion and non-religion"); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 60 (1985) (stating that "the 
government must pursue a course of complete neutrality toward religion"); Roemer v. 
Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 747-48 (1976) ("Neutrality is what is required"); 
Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 449 (1971) (positing that the central purpose of 
the Establishment Clause is to "[ensure] governmental neutrality in matters of religion"); 
Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970) (stating that "[!]he general principle de-
ducible from the First Amendment and all that has been said by the Court is this: that 
we will not tolerate either governmentally established religion or governmental interference 
with religion"); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968) (stating that the "First 
Amendment mandates governmental neutrality between religion and religion, and between 
religion and nonreligion"); Abington Sch. Dis!. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 225 (1963) 
(indicating that the government's position of neutrality means that it may neither support 
the tenets of any or all religions, nor exhibit hostility to religion in general); Zorach v. 
Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952) (supporting "an attitude on the part of government 
that shows no partiality to any one group and that lets each flourish according to the zeal 
of its adherents and the appeal of its dogma"); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. I, 
18 (1947) (emphasizing that the First Amendment "requires the state to be a neutral in its 
relations with groups of religious believers and non-believers"). See also Douglas Laycock, 
A Survey of Religious Liberty in the United States, 47 Omo ST. L.J. 409, 409 (1986) 
(indicating a belief that the two religion clauses merit "equal seriousness,"' and therefore, 
"that government neutrality towards religion is a good first approximation for the meaning 
of the clauses"'). Various versions of the Religion Clauses were rejected by the framers to 
assuage the fears that the proposed amendments might disfavor religion generally or even 
favor atheism. See CHESTER J. ANTIEAU ET AL., FREEDOM FROM FEDERAL ESTABLISH-
MENT: FORMATION AND EARLY HISTORY OF THE FiRST AMENDMENT RELIGION CLAUSES 
137-38 (1964) (indicating that the first Congress considered multiple versions of the Reli-
gion Clauses); Laycock, supra, at 412-13 (quoting individuals among the framers who 
feared that the clauses would abolish religion or favor atheists). 
80. It is no answer that free exercise claims are different from Establishment Clause 
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Applying Weisman, an Establishment Clause case, to free exer-
cise issues is somewhat controversial81 since the religion clauses 
of the First Amendment are often treated as embracing separate, 
even contradictory principles. The distinction made is that the Free 
Exercise Clause confers benefits on religion, while the Establish-
ment Clause imposes burdens on religion. This, however, is a false 
dichotomy - the principles protected by the two clauses are not 
antipodal, but are remarkably similar. Establishments of religion are 
offensive because they force people to submit to or subsidize a 
faith they do not espouse, or to suffer the indignity of seeing their 
government endorse such a faith. To the irreligious, however, the 
injury caused by religion is no worse than injury caused by gov-
ernmental adoption of a nonreligious doctrine that they reject. 
Establishments of particular religions, as opposed to nonreligious 
doctrines, are therefore distinctly repugnant primarily to those who 
espouse other religions.82 Religion cannot be singled out as divi-
claims because offense to one's religion cannot be avoided without gutting education, 
while endorsement of religion can always be avoided. Perceptions of government endorse-
ment of religion can never be fully avoided. In a society like ours, religion is a ubiqui-
tous and integral part of life. V!TZ, supra note 4, at 80 ("religion, especially Christianity, 
has played and continues to play a central role in American life"). Thus, a good educa-
tion will frequently deal with religion in ways that some might interpret as endorsements. 
A positive treatment of the Reverend Martin Luther King, for example, might be seen by 
some as endorsing his religious views. Many public schools have tried to eliminate all 
references to religion. For example, one social studies book instructed children that at the 
First Thanksgiving the Pilgrims gave thanks to the Indians. See id. at 3. Not only are 
these pathetic efforts doomed to failure, but the goal of avoiding all references to religion 
is undesirable since it inevitably distorts students' understanding of our society by ripping 
an important part of our cultural heritage from the curriculum. See id. at 80 ("To neglect 
to report ... [religion's role in American life] is simply to fail to carry out the major 
duty of any textbook writer-the duty to tell the truth."). 
81. See John Garvey, Cover Your Ears, 43 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 761, 761 (1993) 
(pointing out that issues in Weisman, an Establishment Clause case, and those of various 
free exercise cases are doctrinally different). But see infra note 93 and accompanying text. 
82. Although believers are most often offended by the establishment of another's reli-
gion, many are also offended by the establishment of their own faith. For example, many 
Anabaptists believe that an establishment of their own faith would violate their principle 
of free will in religious matters. See generally Steven D. Smith, The Rise and Fall of 
Religious Freedom in Constitutional Discourse, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 149 (1991). Professor 
Smith argues persuasively that the traditional justifications for religious freedom were 
themselves based on religion. /d. at 149. Commentators and the Supreme Court have 
eschewed these explanations in favor of secular justifications. /d. at 197 (describing the 
most common secular justifications as: the "civic virtue" rationale, the "personal autono-
my" rationale, the "pluralism" rationale, the "civic strife" rationale, and the "nonalienation" 
rationale). The secular justifications are unsatisfactory, however, and reliance on them will 
generate confusion. See id. at 198 (stating that the secular rationales are "probably too 
weak and vulnerable to sustain a strong constitutional commitment to religious liberty"). 
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sive. Although religious conflict has caused much strife, nonreli-
gious disputes have been even more deadly both in this country 
and in the rest of the world.83 The principle function, then, of the 
two religion clauses is the same-to eliminate or minimize gov-
ernment offense to citizens' religious beliefs. 
Although Weisman holds promise for free exercise claims, 
Professor Lupu has argued that the First Amendment discussion in 
Rust v. Sullivan84 points the other way.85 In Rust, the Supreme 
Court held that, while government cannot prohibit abortions, it may 
forbid federally funded counseling services to give advice about 
abortions.86 Professor Lupu says: "If the government may impose 
benefit conditions that expressly limit protected speech, benefit 
conditions that are generally reasonable but unintentionally affect 
religion are presumably valid a fortiori."87 
Rust has little relevance to free exercise claims of public 
school children. The rule in Rust forbids government agents to 
make certain statements that their clients want to hear. 88 A proper 
analogy to Rust would be a situation in which a teacher desires to 
teach something that the government excludes from the curriculum. 
Consistent with Rust, the government may generally dictate a cur-
riculum and expect the teachers to conform with it. 89 Most free 
83. See id. at 207-10 (stating that ""religion is only one of a number of sources of 
civil strife''). In the World Wars and the American Civil War, religion played a small 
role. The mass killings by Communists in the Soviet Union and China and by the Na-
tional Socialists in Germany were carried out by governments officially committed to 
atheism. See id. at 208 n.236 (""'Religious differences in this country have never generat-
ed the civil discord experienced in political conflicts over such issues as the Vietnam 
War, racial segregation, the Red Scare, unionization, or slavery.'"' (quoting Michael W. 
McConnell, Political and Religious Disestablishment, 1986 B.Y.U. L. REv. 405, 413)). 
84. lll S. Ct. 1759, 1771-76 (1991). 
85. See Lupu, supra note 37, at 752 n.36. 
86. Rust, Ill S. Ct. at 1777 (rejecting petitioners' contention that the regulations pro-
hibiting any discussion of abortion by recipient organizations of federal family planning 
funds violated the First Amendment). 
87. Lupu, supra note 37, at 752 n.36. Regarding Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 
(1963), and other Supreme Court cases holding that states may not deny unemployment 
benefits to people who leave or refuse jobs for religious reasons, Lupu says that "[o]ne 
might therefore expect the entire Sherbert line to disappear sometime soon."" Lupu, supra 
note 37, at 752 n.36. 
88. See Rust, Ill S. Ct. at 1777. 
89. See, e.g., Roberts v. Madigan, 702 F. Supp. 1505, 1515 (D. Colo. 1989) (holding 
that State authorities could regulate a teacher's classroom conduct, and thus forbid both 
the teacher from silently reading the Bible during the students' independent reading peri-
od, and direct the teacher to teach students actively during that time), aff'd, 921 F.2d 
1047 (lOth Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 3025 (1992). 
Even the evolution cases are not really exceptions. In those cases, the Court forbade 
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exercise claims by school children, however, seek not to silence 
government agents, but to avoid messages that these agents would 
otherwise force them to hear.90 The state's power to prescribe the 
scope of teachers' speech while on the job does not imply a power 
to require children to hear that speech. 
A further difference is the cost of obtaining private substitutes. 
Both the rule in Rust and religiously offensive public schoolh1g 
may force citizens to buy substitutes. Yet whereas private abortion 
counseling is too expensive only for the poorest of Americans, 
private schooling is unattainable fOi most Americans.91 Thus, the 
burden that religiously offensive public education inflicts on free 
exercise far exceeds the burden that the rule in Rust imposes on 
abortion rights. 
In sum, there is good reason to think that the traditional stan-
dard of free exercise review prevails, at least for claims by public 
school students. Although Employment Division v. Smith raises 
fears about the vitality of the Free Exercise Clause, statements in 
state legislatures to prohibit by statute the teaching of evolution or to require equal time 
for instruction about evolution and creationism. See, e.g., Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 
578, 596-97 (1987) (holding that a state law requiring either that the theory of evolution 
be banished from public schools' curriculum or that it be taught in conjunction with "cre-
ation science," violates the Establishment Clause); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 109 
( 1968) (holding unconstitutional a state statute prohibiting instruction on the theory of 
evolution). The Court has never ruled, however, that individual teachers have a right to 
teach evolution or not to teach creationism. Arguably then, local school boards may still 
omit instruction on evolution or treat it equally with creationism. 
Courts have occasionally voided the firing of public school teachers whose in-
struction was unacceptable to school authorities, but the cases are inr.onsistent and the 
scope of the teacher's discretion is unclear. See Wll.LIAM D. VALENTE, EDUCATION LAW: 
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE § 13.8 (1985) ("[T]he fact remains that the courts have not devel-
oped any consensus on the limits of academic freedom."). For a discussion of Rust's im-
pact on claims for substitute instruction, see infra text accompanying notes 184-90. 
90. See Grove v. Mead Sch. Dist., 753 F.2d 1528, 1531 (9th Cir.) (plaintiffs sued as a 
result of the school board's refusal to remove a book that was religiously offensive), cert. 
denied, 474 U.S. 826 (1985); Wright v. Houston lndep. Sch. Dist., 366 F. Supp. 1208, 
1208 (S.D. Tex. 1972) (plaintiffs sought to enjoin instruction on the theory of evolution 
which did not include instruction on other human origin theories), aff'd per curiam, 486 
F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 969 (1975). 
91. The Court in Rust conceded that the situation might be different if "the doctor-pa-
tient relationship established by the Title X program [were] sufficiently all-encompassing 
so as to justify an expectation on the part of the patient of comprehensive medical ad-
vice." Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 1759, 1776 (1991). 1n contrast, public schooling is 
about as "all-encompassing" as a government program can be: it occupies more time in 
the lives of most citizens than any other government program. Even if a family is able to 
pay for ·a religiously inoffensive private education, no school offering such an education 
may be locally available. 
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both that case as well as in the later decision of Lee v. Weisman 
indicate that the Supreme Court has not diluted the standards for 
free exercise claims, at least in the context of public schools. Rust 
· does not undermine this conclusion. Hopefully the traditional stan-
dard will survive. Government should not tell people, especially 
young children, that their religion is wrong. 
IV. ELEMENTS OF Tiffi FREE EXERCISE STANDARD 
A. Overview 
The Free Exercise Clause should be viewed as embracing two 
complementary principles. 92 First, government should be as neutral 
as possible about religion in the sense of neither promoting nor 
hindering any particular religion or religion in general.93 Second, 
government should aim to maximize religious freedom. The Su-
preme Court seems to embrace this principle in Weisman when it 
says that religion is "committed to the private sphere" and should 
be "free from governmental interference. "94 
92. Acceptance of this view has grown among scholars. See, e.g., Mary Ann Glendon 
& Raul F. Yanes, Structural Free Exercise, 90 MICH. L. REV. 477, 541 (1991) ("If the 
two religion provisions are read together in the light of an overarching purpose to protect 
freedom of religion, most of the tension between them disappears."). 
93. Thus I largely embrace the definition of substantive neutrality offered by Douglas 
Laycock. See Laycock, supra note 63, at 1001-02 (elaborating upon his basic formulation 
of substantive neutrality, which is the constitutional requirement that government "mini-
mize the extent to which it either encourages or discourages religious belief or disbelief, 
practice or nonpractice, observance or nonobservance"). The Supreme Court has frequently 
stated that the Religion Clauses require governmental neutrality toward religion. See supra 
note 79 and accompanying text. 
Neutrality has been attacked as "inherently indeterminate." Smith, supra note 57, at 
315. See also John T. Valauri, The Concept of Neutrality in Establishment Clause Doc-
trine, 48 U. PITI. L. REv. 83, 94-104 (1986) (discussing and illustrating the complexity 
and ambiguity of neutrality, a concept having two components: noninvolvement and impar-
tiality). While no concept of neutrality can generate basic, substantive norms, more modest 
conceptions of neutrality are possible. See Cass R. Sunstein, Neutrality in Constitutional 
Law (With Special Reference to Pornography, Abortion, and Surrogacy), 92 COLUM. L. 
REv. 1, 50 (1992) (providing illustrations of less ambitious goals of neutrality). By defin-
ing neutrality as neither promoting nor hindering religion, one admittedly accepts, to some 
extent, a non-neutral status quo in the sense that some religious groups are more influen-
tial than others in American society. Under Sunstein's approach, if the existing distribution 
of religious influence is not unjust, there should be no objection to a neutrality in which 
government neither alters nor affmnatively maintains the status quo, but instead leaves the 
distribution to be determined by non-governmental forces. See id. at 52. 
94. Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2656-57 (1992). In making such an assertion, 
the Supreme Court seems to have adopted the position of Michael McConnell: "The prin- · 
cipal purpose of the Religion Clauses is to ensure that decisions about religious practice, 
including education, are reserved to the private reahn of individual conscience." Michael 
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Neutrality is not mathematically determinable, but a term of 
art.95 For instance, a public museum that exhibits religious works 
of art gives unequal treatment to religions like Islam that forbid art 
with religious content.96 This form of inequality is inevitable. 
Consider, for example, if publicly subsidized museums excluded 
works solely because of their religious content. That kind of 
separationism would unnecessarily hinder religion. Such a position 
cannot be squared with the principle of religious freedom. The 
Supreme Court, however; has not always pursued this principle: 
"Separationism and antimajoritarianism, rather than religious free-
dom, became central to the Warren Court's approach in Religion 
Clause cases. "97 
One problem in defining neutrality is to determine the context 
in which to analyze government acts and the baseline from which 
neutrality must be maintained.98 For example, accommodation of 
W. McConnell, Multiculturalism, Majoritarianism, and Educational Choice: What Does 
Our Constitutional Tradition Have to Say?, 1991 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 123, 145. See also 
Laycock, supra note 64, at 1002 ("What happens to religion is up to the people acting 
severally and voluntarily; it is not up to the people acting collectively through govern-
ment."). 
95. A neutrality standard still "requires judgments about the relative significance of 
various encouragements and discouragements to religion." Laycock, supra note 63, at 
1004. Thus, it is a valid criticism that a neutrality standard does not automatically resolve 
all Religion Clause questions. See Smith, supra note 57, at 313-16 (discussing the absence 
of any coherent, clear neutrality doctrine and the inherently indeterminable nature of the 
concept of neutrality itself); Valauri, supra note 93, at 85 ("Because of the equivocal 
nature of neutrality, its adoption and use mask, even exacerbate, doctrinal disagreement 
and conflict."). 
96. See Laycock, supra note 63, at 1003 (illustrating that total neutrality is not always 
possible since "a standard of minimizing both encouragement and discouragement (often 
means] that religion (is] singled out for special treatment"). 
97. Glendon & Yanes, supra note 92, at 493 (discussing the need for the Court to 
take a structural approach in its interpretation of the Religion Clauses in order to develop 
a "workable, coherent, church-state jurisprudence" in the pluralistic American society). 
98. See Laycock, supra note 63, at 1005 (explaining that the neutrality standard re-
quires the determination of a proper baseline from which encouragement and discourage-
ment are to be measured). If care is not taken, the status quo can be unthinkingly used 
as the baseline. Then, maintenance of the status quo is deemed neutral and any departure 
from it is non-neutral. For example, the Supreme Court has often treated government 
funding of secular public schools as a religiously neutral baseline and has held that any 
state aid to parochial school children constitutes a non-neutral subsidy of religion that vio-
lated the Establishment Clause. See, e.g., Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 409 (1985) 
("Even where state aid to parochial institutions does not have the primary effect of ad-
vancing religion, the provision of such aid may nonetheless violate the Establishment 
Clause owing to the nature of the interaction of church and state in the administration of 
that aid."). This status quo is hardly neutral, however, because it confers an expensive 
benefit on those who attend public (secular) schools, while denying that be~efit to those 
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religious children in public schools is often opposed as an advance-
ment of religion.99 This argument makes sense only if the instruc-
tion from which accommodation is sought is religiously neutral. 
Often, however, it is not. In fact, instruction often disparages 
children's religious beliefs even if there is no intent to dispar-
age. 100 In such circumstances, accommodation is neutral if it 
merely seeks to free the children from such disparagement and, 
from a secular perspective, does not leave them in a better position 
than other children. 101 
Although accommodation increases the religious freedom of 
those accommodated, overbroad accommodation limits the freedom 
of others in two ways. First, when accommodation is expensive, 
taxpayers are forced to subsidize the religious observance of those 
accommodated. Also, excessive accommodation prefers those 
accommodated. This could occur if certain sects were given whole-
sale exemptions from drug use restrictions or other burdensome 
laws. Thus, accommodation should be granted only when it impos-
es no substantial costs on others through government and does not 
privilege those accommodated. 
B. Substantial Infringement of a Sincere Belief 
Establishing a prima facie violation of free exercise requires 
showing an infringement of a sincere religious belief or prac-
tice. 102 The infringement must be substantial; de minimis infringe-
ments do not suffice. 103 Weisman makes clear that arguments of 
who attend religioUs schools. True neutrality would extend equal aid to children in both 
secular and religious schools. 
99. See Mozert v. Hawkin County Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1987), cert. 
denied, 484 U.S. 1066 (1988) (rejecting request for accommodation). 
100. See Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2659 (1992) (stating that "the religious 
exercise'' caused "embarrassment and ... intrusion" and "[a]ssuming ... that the prayers 
were offensive to the student"); Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 624 (1986) (Scalia, 
J., dissenting) (indicating that the censorship of creation science may incorrectly teach 
students that science has definitely falsified their religious beliefs). 
101. A policy of no aid to any private school treats religious schools equally with non-
sectarian private schools. From the perspective of religious freedom, however, this policy 
is not neutral because public schools, which do receive government aid, are secular. Thus, 
the no-aid policy discriminates against religion. See Valauri, supra note 93, at 103 (em-
phasizing that a no aid principle is not a neutral principle since it does not meet the 
requirement of impartiality). 
102. Ware v. Valley Stream High Sch. Dis!., 550 N.E.2d 420, 426 (N.Y. 1989) (stating 
that in order for the claimant to receive an exemption, she "must show . a sincerely held 
religious belief that is burdened by a State requirement"). 
103. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 683 (1984) (stating that "whatever benefit 
there is to one faith or religion or to all religions, is indirect, remote, and incidental"); 
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insubstantiality will face skepticism in the Supreme Court. 104 In 
that case, the Supreme Court conceded that the commencement 
prayer in issue was "a brief exercise" which the individual was 
free to ignore. 105 Yet "the embarrassment and the intrusion" of 
the prayer could not be dismissed as "de minimis."106 The Court 
stated that the school authorities' effort "to be civic or nonsectarian 
rather than pertaining to one sect does not lessen the offense or 
isolation to the objectors. At best it narrows their number, at worst 
[it] increases their sense· of isolation and affront. " 107 One could 
infer from this statement that rarely can a religious affront be 
excused as de minimis. 
The belief infringed must be religious. 108 Sometimes free ex-
ercise claims encounter the defense that the challenged practice is 
inherently nonreligious. An objective standard of what is religiously 
significant is inevitably discriminatory since every sect has its own 
idea of what is religiously relevant. An objective standard discrimi-
nates against minority sects because the attitudes of their members 
often appear odd or irrational to the majority. An objective stan-
dard also discriminates against traditional or fundamentalist sects 
because, for members of these sects, religion is perva-
sive-everything in their lives is religiously significant. 109 Under 
an objective standard, modernist sectarians and secularists, who 
have a narrower concept of what is religious, could restrict the 
religious freedom of others by classifying many activities as objec-
Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 795 (1983) ('"distinguish[ing] between real threat and 
mere shadow"' and characterizing legislative prayer as "no real threat") (quoting Abington 
Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 308 (1963) (Goldberg, J., concurring)); Braunfeld v. 
Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 605-06 (1961) (indicating that laws prohibiting retail sales on Sun-
days imposed "only an indirect burden" on Orthodox Jewish businessmen). 
104. See Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2659 (1992). 
105. /d. (noting that during the prayer "the individual can concentrate on joining its 
message, meditate on her own religion, or let her mind wander"). 
106. Id. ("[W]e think that the intrusion is greater than the two minutes or so of time 
consumed for prayers like these."). 
107. /d. 
108. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972) ("[T]o have the protection of the 
Religion Clauses, the claims must be rooted in religious belief."); Ware v. Valley Stream 
High Sch. Dist., 550 N.E.2d 420, 426 (N.Y. 1989) (burdened belief must be a "sincerely 
held religious" one). 
109. See Steven D. Smith, Separation and the "Secular": Reconstructing the Disestab-
lishment Decision, 67 TEX. L. REV. 955, 997 (1989) (emphasizing that "[f]or many reli-
gious persons, religious and secular beliefs and values are not nicely compartmentalized[;] 
religious beliefs and values may permeate a religious person's world view") and authori-
ties cited therein. 
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tively nonreligious. 
For example, in a free exercise challenge to the teaching of 
evolution, a federal judge failed to recognize this potentially ad-
verse impact of an objective standard. 110 He proclaimed that "the 
offending material is peripheral to the matter of religion"! 111 
Consider, also, such issues as the consumption of pork, the cover-
ing of one's head, and the style of one's undergarments. To mod-
ernist sects and nonreligious persons, these issues have no religious 
significance, but to Muslims, observant Jews and Mormons, they 
are very significant. The determination of what is religiously im-
portant should be left to the individual claiming a free exercise 
violation and not to some objective criterion dictated by the 
state.112 
C. Free Exercise Claims and Government Benefits 
The argument that government need not adjust its benefits to 
suit the religion of each citizen113 often makes sense. For exam-
ple, a citizen cannot require the government to remove a globe 
from a post office or to provide an alternative post office just 
because the globe offends the individual's religious belief that the 
world is flat. The Court in Employment Division v. Smith seemed 
to expand this principle by holding that government can withhold a 
benefit (unemployment compensation) because of a person's crimi-
110. See Wright v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 366 F. Supp. 1208, 1211 (S.D. Tex. 
1972) (denying plaintiffs' request that "all theories regarding human origins" receive 
"equal time"), aff'd per curiam, 486 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 969 
(1974). 
Ill. Wright, 366 F. Supp. at 121l (further stating that "(s]cience and religion necessari-
ly deal with many of the same questions, and they may frequently provide conflicting 
answers [, but t]eachers of science in the public schools should not be expected to avoid" 
discussions of science that conflict with religion). 
112. This issue is different from the question of what constitutes a religion for purposes 
of the First Amendment. An objective standard must be used to detennine what is a reli-
gion under the Establishment Clause. Otherwise, a citizen could overturn any government 
activity simply by declaring that she considers the attitude promoted by the activity "reli-
gious." This mode of attack was attempted in Smith v. Board of School Commissioners, 
in which the plaintiffs alleged that public schools had established the religion of secular 
humanism through the use of particular textbooks. The attempt failed because the court, 
referring to the requirements of the three-factored test from Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 
602, 612-13 (1971), denied that any doctrines being promoted by the public schools 
through their textbooks amounted to the establishment of a religion of secular humanism. 
Smith v. Board of Sch. Cornrn'rs, 827 F.2d 684, 688 (11th Cir. 1987). 
113. See Ware v. Valley Stream High Sch. Dist., 550 N.E.2d 420, 427 (N.Y. 1989) 
(st~ting that "parents have no constitutional right to tailor public school programs to indi-
vidual preferences, including religious preferences"). 
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nal use of drugs in a religious ceremony. 114 
Lee v. Weisman suggests a very different attitude. The prayer 
in Weisman was defended on the ground that attendance at com-
mencement was voluntary."5 This argument emphasized, in ef-
fect, that attendance was a government benefit that objectors were 
free to forego. 116 The Court dismissed this argument as 
formalistic in the extreme . . . . Everyone knows that in 
our society and in our culture high school graduation is 
one of life's most significant occasions .... [I]t is appar-
ent that a student is not free to absent herself fiOm the 
graduation exercise in any real sense of the term "volun-
tary," ... The Constitution forbids the State to exact reli-
gious conformity from a student as the price of attending 
her own high school graduation. 117 
This statement at least lays to rest the argument that anyone 
religiously offended by public education should simply attend a 
private school. Education is not only crucial in modem life, but is 
also legally obligatory. 118 The alternative of a religiously accept-
able private school is cost prohibitive for many individuals and, 
furthermore, is unavailable at any price for small sects who have 
not established religious schools. For many individuals, then, public 
education is not "in any real sense of the term 'voluntary. "'119 
Arguments to the contrary are "formalistic in the extreme."120 
However, the Court in Weisman also cautioned that not "every 
state action implicating religion is invalid if one or a few citizens 
find it offensive . . . . [O]ffense alone does not in every case show 
a violation. We know too that sometimes to endure social isolation 
or even anger may be the price of conscience or nonconformi-
ty."121 The Court's statement makes sense if the goal of free ex-
ercise claimants is to invalidate government acts that offend them. 
This is because an invalidation or prohibition would deprive other 
114. 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990). For a discussion of Employment Division v. Smith, see 
supra notes 37-54 and accompanying text. 
I15. Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2659 (1992). 
I16. See id. 
I17. !d. at 2659-60. 
I18. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3321.04 (Baldwin 1988); N.Y. COMP. CODES 
R. & REGs. tit. 8, § 101.2 (1987). 
119. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. at 2659. 
120. !d. 
121. !d. at 2661. 
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citizens, who are not offended, of the benefits of those acts. In 
general, though, free exercise claimants do not seek to invalidate 
government action, but instead only seek some accommodation for 
themselves. 122 Thus, the Court's warning of a limit to relief from 
an offensive government action seems less appropriate when the 
relief sought is not invalidation, but accommodation. 
The Religion Clauses also raise more general questions about 
the form of government benefits. Government generally provides 
benefits in three ways. First, it furnishes some benefits as cash 
benefits, like Aid to Families with Dependent Children123 and ag-
ricultural price supports. 124 Second, it provides vouchers, as in 
food stamps125 and college tuition under the GI bill. 126 Third, it 
provides some benefits in kind, through services, as in the case of 
public schools and hospitals. 
The choice among these forms in a particular case generally 
depends on administrative convenience, effectiveness in achieving 
policy objectives, and the dignity of the beneficiaries; the impact 
on religious freedom is rarely considered at all. The choice, howev-
er, may determine the ££pstitutionality of the plan. For example, 
welfare recipients are free to donate part of their benefits to a 
church; indeed, it would be unconstitutional to forbid such dona-
tions with welfare grants. Yet if a state decided to cease cash 
payments and to provide benefits in kind, some taxpayers would 
undoubtedly complain if the state agreed to pay state funds directly 
to a beneficiary's church, even if this method of direct payment by 
the state produced the same result as a system of cash grants. The 
beneficiary's freedom to make donations would be lost. In this 
way, the growth of the welfare state can diminish religious free-
dom.127 
This danger should alert us to interpret the Free Exercise 
Clause broadly enough and the Establishment Clause narrowly 
enough to preserve religious freedom. Consider, for example, a 
122. See supra note 31 and acc9mpanying text (cases where individual accommodation 
sought). 
123. 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-617 (1988) (aid program for families with dependent children). 
124. 7 U.S.C. § 1421 (1988) (agricultural price support program). 
125. /d. §§ 2011-2030 (1988) (food stamp program). 
126. 38 U.S.C. § 1411 (1988) (education assistance program for "service on active 
duty"). 
127. See Glendon & Yanes, supra note 92, at 486 (stating that the growth of the reg-
ulatory and welfare state exacerbated the problems created by the Supreme Court's adop-
tion of separationism). 
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patient who requests kosher meals in a public hospital. If this 
accommodation be deemed an unconstitutional establishment of 
religion, the patient must either forego hospitalization that may be 
crucial to her survival or violate her religious beliefs. On the other 
hand, if free exercise required that she be accommodated, she 
would be freed from making this painful choice. The situation of 
religious school children is often quite similar. 
D. Overriding Governmental Interest in Education 
As noted earlier, Employment Division v. Smith raises doubt as 
to whether infringements of free exercise can be justified only by a 
compelling state interest. 128 If only a rational basis for govern-
ment action were necessary, all free exercise claims would be 
doomed. The special concern expressed in Employment Division v. 
Smith about government actions affecting belief and about parental 
control of children, 129 in addition to the greater sensitivity to reli-
gious freedom evinced in Lee v. Weisman, 130 raise hope that 
more than a rational basis is necessary. Whether that standard is a 
"compelling interest" test or some intermediate test is an important 
question, but one that we cannot yet answer. 
Another important question is whether the state has a strong 
interest in requiririg anything more than the minimum education 
necessary to avoid indigence. In Wisconsin v. Yoder, the Supreme 
Court found no compelling need to require Amish children to 
attend high school at all. 131 The Court stressed that Amish chil-
dren receive on-the-job vocational training and, thus, are unlikely 
to become indigent wards of the state. 132 Yet Yoder, then, would 
not excuse from school attendance children of a sect preaching 
illiteracy or mendicancy. The state may have a compelling interest 
in ensuring that some citizens obtain the higher education needed 
to maintain a modern society. There is, however, no shortage of 
volunteers for higher education. What then, should be required of 
all citizens? 
The state of New York recently claimed a compelling interest 
128. See supra text accompanying notes 22-26. 
129. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 882 (1990). 
130. See Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2659 (1992) (stating "'that the government 
may no more use social pressure to enforce orthodoxy than it may use more direct 
means'"). 
131. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 228-29 (1972). 
132. /d. at 224-25. 
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in subjecting children of the fundamentalist Plymouth Brethren sect 
to school instruction about AIDS. 133 Even assuming that this in-
struction reduces the incidence of AIDS, which is doubtful, how 
much would that effect be impaired by excusing the Plymouth 
children? The state argued that some children might leave the sect 
and pursue "alternative life-styles," and for lack of state instruction, 
these individuals might contract and spread AIDS. 134 This argu-
ment is speculative. It is troubling that religious freedom could be 
curtailed by mere speculation. Assume, however, that the state 
could show a statistical probability that one or two cases of AIDS 
would be prevented by subjecting the Plymouth children to AIDS 
instruction. That evidence clinches the case for the state only if 
religious freedom carries little or no weight as a constitutional 
value. 135 If we take religious freedom seriously, though, we must 
accept certain risks and costs as the price of that freedom. In this 
case, preserving the integrity of the Plymouth Brethren justifies the 
cost of foregoing the uncertain temporal benefit sought by the 
state. 
The argument against requiring most academic instruction is 
even stronger. It simply is not necessary that one know theories of 
evolution or learn reading from particular texts in order to avoid 
poverty or to have a meaningful and rewarding life. What about 
ethics and values? The Supreme Court sometimes suggests that the 
state has a compelling interest in teaching children the values of 
democracy and can further this interest through public educa-
tion.136 The Court, however, also has severely limited, if not ut-
terly rejected, these dicta by statements and holdings in other cases. 
Thus, the Court has held that children may reject public schools 
and attend private schools, 137 or even eschew formal schooling 
133. Ware v. Valley Stream High Sch. Dist., 550 N.E.2d 420, 429-30 (N.Y. 1989). 
134. See id. at 423. 
135. If certain religious sects devalue healthful exercise and diet, would the state be 
warranted in teaching children of these sects that their lifestyle is unwise? 
136. See Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681 (1986) (indicating that the pur-
pose of public education is the inculcation of values necessary to self-governance); Board 
of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 864, 876 (1982) (plurality opinion) (emphasizing the vital 
importance of public schools in the preparation and socialization of future citizens); 
Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 76 (1979) (stating that "[t]he importance of public 
schools in the preparation of individuals for participation as citizens, and in the preser-
vation of the values on which our society rests, long has been recognized by our deci-
sions"). 
137. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925) (holding that states do not 
have the power "to standardize its children by forcing them to accept instruction from 
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beyond the eighth grade. 138 These results are consistent with the 
Court's oft-stated view that government may not compel expres-
sion139 or mandate the imposition of certain values or opinions in 
public schools. 140 
The latter view against compelling expression and imposing 
certain values is the better view. Every polity necessarily embraces 
a."Id tries to promote certain principles. Since the state can reward 
certain actions and punish others, it should also be permitted to 
exhort citizens to take or not take such actions. Public schools 
should be an acceptable means for this purpose. 141 Citizens 
public teachers only"). The Court also asserted, however, that states may require that 
"certain studies plainly essential to good citizenship . . . be taught, and that nothing be 
taught which is manifestly inimical to the public welfare." !d. at 534. 
138. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 219 (1972). 
139. See Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Uti!. Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1, 4, 20 (1986) 
(holding that a state regulatory commission could not require a private utility to include 
advertising fliers, with which the utility disagreed, in its bills); Herbert v. Lando, 441 
U.S. 153, 178 n.l (1979) (Powell, J., concurring) (indicating that "Lite coerced publication 
of particular views . . . violates the freedom of speech"); Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 
431 U.S. 209, 234 (1977) (indicating that a state may not compel public employees to 
make contributions to unions for political purposes without infringing on the employees' 
constitutional rights); Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 717 (1977) (holding that a state 
may not compel drivers to display the state motto on their license plates); Elrod v. Bums, 
427 U.S. 347, 353, 373 (1976) (holding that the government practice of dismissing em-
ployees on a partisan basis is unconstitutional); Miami Herald Pub. Co. v. Tornillo, 418 
U.S. 241, 243, 258 (1974) (holding that a state statute that grants a political candidate a 
right to equal space in a newspaper to reply to personal criticism, thus forcing the news-
paper to publish the replies, violates the guarantees of a free press). See generally David 
B. Gaebler, First Amendment Protection Against Government Compelled Expression and 
Association, 23 B.C. L. REV. 995 (1982) (discussing the Court's failure to articulate a 
consistent approach to negative First Amendment cases, or cases of compelled instruction). 
140. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 223-24 (1972) ("There can be no assumption 
that today's majority is 'right' and the Amish and others like them are 'wrong."'); Tinker 
v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 512 (1969) ("The classroom 
is peculiarly the 'marketplace of ideas."') (quoting Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 
U.S. 589, 603 (1967)); West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 
(1943) (holding that the state may not constitutionally compel students to salute the flag 
and recite a pledge). 
141. Some, including J. S. Mill, disagree with this proposition and would forbid public 
schools altogether. See JOHN S. MILL, ON LIBERTY 148-49 (The Atlantic Monthly Press 
1921) (1859) ("A general State education is a mere contrivance for molding people to be 
exactly like one another . . .. "). Even without public schools, however, the state pro-
motes certain values if it subsidizes education at all. Even a voucher system that permits 
individuals to choose their schools still promotes education as a value. One who accepts 
public educational subsidies could reject public schools, then, only on a theory that public 
schools are particularly coercive. The ability of public schools to inculcate values is limit-
ed, though. See infra text accompanying notes 147-54. Thus, such a theory seems hard to 
maintain. 
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should, however, be allowed to shun instruction that offends them. 
In a liberal democracy, this right is not an exception to the state's 
power to promote values but, rather, an expression of the values it 
promotes. We value freedom of conscience and a right of parents 
to guide the moral and religious education of their children. 142 
The state observes these values when it excuses children from 
indoctrination that offends their religion. 
The problem of the government's imposing values is illustrated 
and underscored by asking which values public schools should 
inculcate. Nadine Strossen argues that "among the most important" 
values that schools can teach are "(1) a tolerance for diversity of 
religious, political and other beliefs and ideas, and (2) a belief that 
every individual should have equal rights and opportunities, regard-
less of such factors beyond the individual's control as race, sex, 
religion, or national origin." 143 These vague generalities appeal to 
most Americans, but any effort to give them real content would be 
controversial. For example, does an emphasis on equal rights mean 
opposition to racial preferences? Does tolerance for religious and 
political diversity mean not criticizing Pat Robertson and Jesse 
Jackson? 
Many people, including many born-again Christians, would be 
offended by Strossen's statement that religion is "beyond the 
individual's control." 144 Even when people agree upon on a val-
ue, they may disagree about its source. For example, is stealing 
wrong because the Bible says that it is wrong, or because, as Rich-
ard Posner says, it circumvents the market?145 More important, 
how can public schools preach tolerance if they practice intolerance 
toward religious minorities? What kind of tolerance do children 
learn when students, like those in Mozert, who refuse instruction 
hostile to their religion are punished rather than accommodat-
ed?'46 
142. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 213-14 ("[T]he values of parental direction of the religious up-
bringing and education of their children in their early and formative years have a high 
place in our society.''). 
143. Strossen, supra note 68, at 376-77 (discussing challenges to "secular hwnanism'' 
and "scientific creationism" in the curricula of public schools and proposing standards for 
the resolution of these challenges). 
144. !d. 
145. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 208, 220-21 (4th ed. 1992) 
(stating that stealing is inefficient and should be discouraged). 
146. See Mozer! v. Hawkins County Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 1058, 1060 (6th Cir. 
1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1066 (1988). Some students in Mozert were suspended. /d. 
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Another objection to ethical indoctrination in public schools is 
that there exists little evidence that public schools can actually 
instill moral values or that particular values are "necessary to the 
maintenance of a democratic political system." 147 Critics long 
charged that Catholic schools teach authoritarian, anti-democratic 
values and loyalty to Church rather than to nation. 148 Today, few 
would claim that parochial school graduates are less patriotic or 
democratic than public school graduates. 149 Thus, whatever the 
public schools did differently seems not to have been too impor-
tant, and it is highly unlikely that accommodating religious children 
who object to certain values education will weaken the national 
commitment to democratic values. 
Indeed, I doubt that those who trumpet the importance of 
teaching democratic values take their own rhetoric very seriously. 
If they did, they would also try to make acceptance of these values 
a condition of receiving government benefits or exercising certain 
rights, such as voting. In fact, there is no such effort. Advocates 
may believe that teaching democratic values in public schools is 
necessary and mild. 150 The evidence shows, however, that such 
147. Ambach v. N01wick, 441 U.S. 68, 77 (1979). Accord Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 
478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986) (public school can properly forbid offensive language because 
the use of such language is contrary to necessary values in a democratic society). For 
critiques of this position, see Tyll van Geel, The Search for Constitutional Limits on 
Governmental Authority to Inculcate Youth, 62 TEX. L. REv. 197 passim (1983). "It is 
doubtful that value inculcation in the schools reduces political violence, effectively pre-
pares students for citizenship, or produces loyal and patriotic citizens." Id. at 288-89. See 
also Fred M. Hechinger, Defining Values, N.Y. nMEs, Oct. 21, 1986, at C9 ("The track 
record of teaching values through formal instruction is not encouraging."). 
148. See Philip E. Johnson, Concepts and Compromise in First Amendmellt Religion 
Doctrine, 72 CAL. L. REV. 817, 843-44 (1984) (stating that American courts and commen-
tators of the 1940's viewed the Catholic Church and its schools as "primarily concerned 
with indoctrinating the children to be obedient to the Church and its priests"); Laycock, 
supra note 79, at 417-18 (explaining that as late as 1962 the Catholic Church was being 
described .as a totalitarian system that threatened American freedoms). See also Jeremy 
Rabkin, Disestablished Religion in America, 86 PUB. INTEREST 124, 133-34 (1987) (stating 
that the belief that the Catholic hierarchy taught undemocratic values led to an opposition 
to state funding for Catholic schools in the Nineteenth Century). 
149. See ANDREW M. GREELEY & PETER H. ROSSI, THE EDUCATION OF CATHOLIC 
AMERICANS 114-36 (1966) (asserting that parochial and public school graduates do not 
differ in their political attitudes). 
150. See Stanley Ingber, Religious Children and the Inevitable Compulsion of Public 
Schools, 43 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 773, 792 (1993). Ingber claims that "[s]chools cannot 
avoid instilling values." I d. Ingber also minimizes the affront the teaching of such values 
will have on religious children and their parents: exposure to "objectionable ideas" in pub-
lic schools "is to be expected." Id. at 787. Religious children, Ingber argues, have no 
greater claim to be free from exposure to objectionable beliefs than anyone else. !d. 
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teaching is unnecessary, and the complaints of the religious indi-
cate that, at least in their eyes, it is not mild. 151 
Professor Ingber counters that if public schools cannot effec-
tively inculcate democratic values, then they also cannot lure chil-
dren from their faith, as religious parents fear. 152 This argument 
misconstrues the critique of public school indoctrination of values. 
One part of the critique is that democratic values may be instilled 
in ways other than public school instruction, as evidenced by the 
support of democracy among parochial school graduates. 153 A 
second part is that widespread acceptance of these values may be 
unnecessary to preserve democracy. 154 Neither of these criticisms 
suggests that public schools can never inculcate values. 
Further, even if schools cannot instill values, they may still 
undermine values that children learn elsewhere. Children who are 
confronted with conflicting instruction from school on one hand, 
and from church and parents on the other, may react by rejecting 
both. Faith is threatened even more when the school's opposition 
to it is bolstered by values of the broader society. Even if public 
schools cannot inculcate certain values, they may, by acting in con-
cert with radio, television, movies, magazines, and the attitudes and 
behavior of a child's peers, be able to erode religious belief. 
Once again, this does not mean that public schools must not 
teach values at all; education inevitably bolsters some values and 
weakens others. Public schools can promote certain values over the 
objection of a substantial minority or even a majority. When the 
instruction clashes with religious belief, however, it violates the 
free exercise rights of the objectors, who may be entitled to some 
accommodation. 
E. Corrosive Secularism and Excessive Entanglement 
The Supreme Court has often stated that prohibiting govern-
ment aid to religion not only protects the freedom of citizens who 
do not want their taxes so used, but also protects religious organi-
zations against "corrosive secularism."155 No doubt, government 
151. See supra notes 3-19 and accompanying text. Religious parents can hardly be 
blamed for vehemently objecting to some of the affronts to their beliefs espoused in our 
public schools. 
152. Ingber, supra note 150, at 784 n.55. 
153. See GREELEY & ROSSI, supra note 149, at 125-27 (showing that Catholic school 
graduates are no more intolerant of freedom of speech and religion than their public 
school counterparts). 
154. See van Gee), supra note 147, at 263. 
155. See Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2666 (1992) (stating that even a 
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aid can have that effect. One should not be surprised, then, that 
religion remains more vibrant in America than in many nations 
with established churches. To avoid this corrosion, however, re-
quires not a blanket condemnation of any aid that reaches a reli-
gious organization, but a more nuanced concern about the kind of 
aid and its likely effects. 
For example, state funding for ecclesiastical salaries may influ-
ence who is chosen to be a cleric. Even if the state plays no ap-
parent role in the choice, fear of reduction or elimination of fund-
ing may influence a sect's choice of clergy and also intimidate 
incumbent clerics. Many existing aid programs do not seem to 
have corroded religion/56 however, and it is unlikely that many 
proposed programs would do so, either. As government increased 
aid to higher education after World War II, some colleges became 
less distinctively sectarian. 157 Government aid, however, probably 
did not. cause these changes. Although some religious colleges 
became less sectarian, so did many parochial schools that receive 
no government aid. The changes seem to result from forces far 
broader than government aid programs. Moreover, government aid 
to college students helped to spawn colleges that are more deeply 
religious. Thus, government aid to higher education has neither 
promoted nor corroded religion. It simply increased religious free-
dom by giving students choices they would not have had if aid 
were limited to public or nondenominational colleges. Similarly, 
enacting voucher programs for primary and secondary school chil-
dren more than likely would not promote or corrode either religion 
in general, or the religious mission of parochial schools. 
Opposition to government aid because of its corrosive secular-
ism is never made by the recipient sect; if the sect perceives such 
a threat, it simply rejects the aid. 158 Thus, opposition always co-
governmentally favored religion may be "compromised as political figures reshape the 
religion's beliefs for their own purposes"); Grand Rapids Sch. Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 
385 (1985) (stating that state sponsored religious indoctrination, if allowed to occur, would 
"taint" the religious beliefs with a "corrosive secularism"). 
156. Indeed, the Supreme Court has upheld certain aid programs and thus did not find 
that they corroded religion. See, e.g., Witters v. Washington Dep't of Services for the 
Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 482 (1986) (upholding a state provision of aid to students attending 
religious schools); Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 767 (1976) (upholding 
direct state subsidies to colleges affiliated with the Catholic Church); Everson v. Board of 
Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947) (permitting a state to pay for the bus transportation of 
parochial school students). 
157. At many sectarian colleges, mandatory religious instruction and chapel attendance 
have ended and enrollment of students of other faiths has increased. 
158. In theory, objection could be filed by dissident members of a sect. In practice, this 
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mes from non-members of the recipient sect, often from groups 
and judges who seem hostile to traditional religions or religion 
generally. This gives reason to doubt the sincerity of the 
opposition's concern about corrosive secularism. 
A related issue is the excessive entanglement between church 
and state that may occur when government monitors a religious 
organization's compliance with the constitutional requirements of an 
aid program. The Supreme Court has struck down some aid pro-
grams because they provided no monitoring to prevent the use of 
government money to promote religion. 159 Where monitoring is 
provided, however, the Court bans the program for creating exces-
sive entanglement between church and state. 160 Moreover, where 
a program lacks monitoring, the Court sometimes declares that, if 
monitoring were introduced, it would create excessive entangle-
ment. 161 Critics on and off the Court have called this a Catch-22 
argument: "the very supervision of the aid to assure that it does 
not further religion renders the statute invalid." 162 
The concept of excessive entanglement between church and 
state is not helpful. The goal of the religion clauses is to enhance 
religious freedom without promoting or hindering religion. So long 
as government activity does not promote religion (or favor one sect 
over another), the concerns of society generally are satisfied; con-
cerns about hindering religion should be raised by the church or its 
members.163 The concept of excessive entanglement obscures 
rather than illuminates the proper analysis of these issues. 
almost never happens. 
159. See, e.g., Grand Rapids Sch. Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 386 (1985) (without 
proper monitoring, a state program where private school teachers were paid with public 
funds to teach after-school classes to private school students creates "too great a risk of 
state-sponsored indoctrination""); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 372 (1975) (to ensure 
publicly supported "auxiliary teachers remain religiously neutral'" while teaching in non-
public schools, state would have to engage in "continued surveillance"" of these teachers). 
160. See Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 413 (1985) (requiring city agents to visit and 
inspect a religious school for evidence of religious matter in Title I classes constituted 
excessive government entanglement with religion). 
161. See, e.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 619 (1971) (stating that state surveil-
lance of state subsidized religious school teachers "will involve excessive and enduring 
entanglement between state and church .. ). 
162. Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 615 (1988). 
163. See Douglas L~ycock, Towards a General Theory of the Religion Clauses: The 
Case of Church Labor Relations and the Right to Church Autonomy, 81 COLUM. L. REv. 
1373, 1383 (1981). 
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E. Student, Parental and Group Rights 
Professor Ingber and others have objected that free exercise 
claims against public schools reflect the faith of the parents but not 
necessarily the faith of the children. 164 The usual retort is that 
our law recognizes "the right of parents . . . to direct the education 
of their children."165 Although this answer is sufficient, the objec-
tion invites a deeper answer. Both the objection and the reply treat 
free exercise claims as raising only issues of individual rights; the 
two views differ only about whether to prefer the rights of the 
parent or the child. However, religious freedom also entails a right 
of religious communities not to be overwhelmed by the power of 
the state. The Court in Yoder recognized this by stressing the sur-
vival of the Amish community and not just the individual rights of 
the claimants. Legal scholarship has paid more attention recently to 
group rights and the idea of community. Akhil Amar has shown 
that this interest is not new, but revives a tradition even older than 
the tradition of individual rights. 166 
The communitarian tradition is especially relevant to the reli-
gion clauses because ''the survival of religious communities is nec-
essary to make the religious freedom of individuals "both possible 
and meaningful." 167 The education of children is crucial to this 
survival. People are mortal, but humanity (we hope) is not. To sur-
vive, religious groups depend on raising their members' children 
within the faith. Although government may not act affirmatively to 
preserve any particular religious group or religion generally, reli-
gious freedom permits, and to some extent requires, government to 
forbear from unnecessarily weakening religious communities. When 
public schools undermine a sect without a compelling need to do 
so, the state should offer reasonable accommodation to children of 
the sect. 
This problem of religion and education is well illustrated by 
164. See Ingber, supra note 150, at notes 70, 71 and accompanying text. 
165. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881 (1990). 
166. Akhil R. Amar, Note, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131, 
1132-33 (1991) (suggesting that the drafters of the Bill of Rights intended to protect 
groups, majority as well as minority, from government). 
167. Note, Reinterpreting the Religion Clauses: Constitutional Construction and Concep-
tions of the Self, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1468, 1475 (1984) (asserting that the Free Exercise 
Clause and Establishment Clause complement each other in protecting religious choice). 
See also Glendon & Yanes, supra note 92, at 544 ("[I]ndividual free exercise cannot be 
treated in isolation from the need for religious associations."). 
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the quandary of the Zobrest family, the plaintiffs in a case now 
before the Supreme Court. 168 Jim Zobrest, who is deaf, was at-
tending a public school which, by federal law, had to provide him 
with a sign-language interpreter. His mother took Jim to Mass and 
in her own words: 
I tried signing what they were saying, but I spent most of 
my time answering questions like, "How long before we 
can go home?'' and "why do we have to come here?'' 
I thought the only way he would learn the basics of 
Christianity was to be at a [Catholic School], where it's 
part of the atmosphere. 169 
At least in some cases, children may need more than a formal, 
doctrinal exposure to religion; to appreciate their religion, they may 
need to live it. The monadic view of rights taken by some civil 
libertarians ignores this need, but anyone who values religious 
freedom cannot ignore it. 
V. REMEDIES 
A. Accommodation of Religion 
Two scholars connected with this symposium have stated antip-
odal views on the question of how much government may or must 
accommodate religion. Professor Marshall argues that courts should 
almost never require accommodation, but that the political branches 
of government may grant discretionary (or permissive) 
accommodation. 170 Professor Lupu, by contrast, opposes discre-
tionary accommodation by the political branches, but construes the 
Free Exercise Clause to require accommodation in some cases. 171 
Although Professor Marshall is correct in saying that judges in 
accommodation cases are likely to favor sects that are large and 
familiar, 172 that problem is likely to be much greater with discre-
168. Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 963 F.2d 1190 (9th Cir.), cert. granted, 
113 S. Ct. 52 (1992). 
169. Tamar Lewin, A Test of Church-State Relations in a Deaf Student's Need, N.Y. 
TIMEs, Feb. 22, 1993, at AIO. 
170. See William P. Marshall, In Defense of Smith and Free Exercise Revisionism, 58 
U. CHI. L. REV. 308, 324 (1991). 
171. Lupu, supra note 37, at 743; Ira C. Lupu, Reconstructing the Establishmeflt 
Clause: The Case Against Discretionary Accommodation of Religion, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 
555, 582-87 (1991) (suggesting that legislative acconunodation will result in prejudice and 
inequality). 
172. Marshall, supra note 170, at 311. 
740 CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43:707 
tionary accommodation by the political branches. Given Professor 
Marshall's position, how should courts respond to unequal accom-
modation of different sects? If they demand equal accommodation 
for disfavored sects, not much remains of Professor Marshall's 
position, because nearly every claim for accommodation can be 
framed as seeking what another sect already has. 173 Alternatively, 
courts could do nothing. In his majority opinion in Employment 
Division v. Smith, Justice Scalia recognized and accepted that 
"leaving accommodation to the political process will place at a 
relative disadvantage those religious practices that are not widely 
engaged in. "174 This is precisely what the government should not 
do - the purpose of the Religion Clauses is to demand govern-
ment neutrality toward religion. Favoritism in accommodation by 
the political branches would also undoubtedly generate pressure on 
the courts to declare various accommodations violative of the Es-
tablishment Clause, thus narrowing the scope of accommodation. 
Many legislative accommodations are adopted out of concern 
that they are constitutionally required, either standing alone or 
because similar accommodations have been granted to other 
sects. 175 Eliminating judicial accommodations would remove this 
concern and therefore decrease legislative accommodation and 
reduce religious freedom. 
Professor Lupu's position is harder to weigh because he would 
allow some discretionary accommodation, but how much is un-
clear.176 The disposition of a free exercise claim depends on at 
least three factors: whether there is a burden on free exercise; 177 
whether granting relief would violate the Establishment Clause by 
promoting religion; 178 and whether granting relief would interfere 
173. For example, fundamentalist children could argue that they do not object to having 
public school texts inimical to their beliefs so long as other children have texts inimical 
to their beliefs; they seek texts consistent with their beliefs only because other children 
have already been granted that accommodation. 
174. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990). 
175. See Glendon & Yanes, supra note 92, at 532 (asserting that pre-Smith decisions 
indicated that accommodation was required unless government interests were unduly bur-
dened). 
176. Lupu refers to leaving "little room." Lupu, supra note 37, at 772. Lupu "would 
assign strong, judicially enforceable content to both the Free Exercise Clause as a plat-
form for mandatory accommodations and the Establishment Clause as a barrier to permis-
sive accommodations, and leave little room between them for the exercise of political 
discretion." /d. 
177. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 214 (1972) (if state action does not 
deny free exercise, no accommodation is required). 
178. As determined by applying the three part test found in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 
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with significant governmental objectives. 179 Especially concerning 
the last factor, the government should be able to decide ab initio 
that accommodation would not unduly hinder significant objectives, 
and courts should not lightly overturn this decision. 
Discretionary accommodation is desirable because it avoids 
litigation. Constitutional litigation is particularly divisive because it 
involves issues of principle. This divisiveness can sometimes be 
mitigated or avoided by legislative or administrative action. Since 
avoidance of strife is arguably one function of the Religion Claus-
es, 180 this mitigation is beneficial. The cost of litigation also 
means that many free exercise (and other constitutional) claims are 
never pressed if litigation is necessary to vindicate them. Discre-
tionary accommodation is desirable to make sure that these claims 
do not go unsatisfied. 
To illustrate these last two points, consider the request of a 
school child for religious accommodation. If only courts can grant 
accommodation, expense will probably prevent the claim from ever 
being made. If the claim is made it will be divisive because it will 
pit the child and parents against school officials who might other-
wise have worked things out amicably. Under Professor Lupu's 
approach, when political branches are unable to grant 
accommodations without court involvement, the litigation necessary 
to authorize the accommodation will often degenerate into a cha-
rade. If government officials support an accommodation, a court 
has no controversy to decide. If the officials merely pretend to 
u.s. 602, 612-13 (1971). 
179. See, e.g., Yoder, 406 U.S. at 214 (in order for a state to deny a free exercise 
claim, there must be "a state interest of sufficient magnitude to override the interest 
claiming protection under the Free Exercise Clause."). 
180. The Supreme Court has sometimes forbidden aid to religious schools on the ground 
that such aid is politically divisive. In Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 
756 (1973), the Court suggested that: '"What is at stake as a matter of policy [in Estab-
lishment Clause cases] is preventing that kind and degree of government involvement in 
religious life that, as history teaches us, is apt to lead to strife and frequently strain a 
political system to the breaking point."' Jd. at 796 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 
U.S. 664, 694 (1970) (Harlan, J., in a separate opinion)). 
See id. at 795-97 (finding that a New York law providing maintenance grants, tui-
tion reimbursement grants and income tax relief to nonpublic schools creates the potential 
for political divisiveness); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 365 n.15 (1975) (suggesting 
that a Pennsylvania act allowing for the loan of materials and equipment to nonpublic 
schools could have politically divisive effects); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 622-24 
(1971) (asserting that the political divisiveness caused by granting aid to parochial schools 
would shift the focus of the community away from more important issues). See also 
Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 429-30 (1962) (holding that prayer recommended by the 
state to be recited every morning in school violates the Establishment Clause). 
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oppose the accommodation in order to facilitate the necessary liti-
gation, they are unlikely to litigate with much zeal. This ineffectual 
opposition will have regrettable effects on adjudication in an ad-
versarial judicial system. Professor Lupu's position also raises 
difficult questions about what is an accommodation. For example, 
is a rule that certain government employees cannot be compelled to 
work on Sundays an accommodation or a neutral general rule? 
Problems with PiOfessor Lupu's position may be better under-
stood by applying the same argument to other constitutional rights. 
For example, should the state deny all due process rights of notice 
and hearing or reject all free speech claims unless order~d by a 
court? I think those who care about constitutional rights would say 
not. Limiting these rights to what is mandated by the courts would 
cause uncertainty, impose unnecessary expense, provoke needless 
disputes, and spawn spurious litigation. The same is true in the 
free exercise area. 181 
Accommodation is neutral when it frees its beneficiaries from a 
burden to which others are not subject or confers a benefit that 
others already enjoy. Accommodation, however, is not neutral 
when it prefers its beneficiaries over others from a temporal or 
secular perspective. A religious objector to public schooling could 
not, for example, demand a private tutor. 182 That kind of accom-
modation would reduce religious freedom by preferring some reli-
gionists over other citizens and by forcing some to subsidize the 
religion of others. 
181. A possible argwnent for Professor Lupu's position is that accommodation of free 
exercise claims could violate the Establishment Clause. However, the danger of such vio-
lations is small enough that government officials should be able to decide in the first in-
stance how to reconcile the two clauses. Courts can hear challenges in the rare cases 
where objections arise. 
182. Exemptions from some general legal obligations are unappealing to most non-mem-
bers of the exempted sect and, therefore, do not favor the exempted sect from a secular 
viewpoint. Accommodation by exemption is intended to relieve religionists of a special 
burden they would suffer from compliance with a law. Because of this special burden, the 
withholding of exemptions cannot be treated as a neutral baseline. If the temporal advan-
tages of an exemption are slight, the benefit to the religious freedom of the exempted 
sect may outweigh the disadvantages to non-members of being denied the exemption. 
Compare Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 5 (1989) (state may not exempt 
religious literature sold by religious organizations from sales tax) and Estate of Thornton 
v. Calder, Inc., 472 U.S. 703, 710-11 (1985) (state may not require employers to excuse 
employees from work on their Sabbath) with Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the 
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 339 (1987) (govern-
ment may exempt religious organizations from ban on religious discrimination in employ-
ment). 
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B. Exemptions from Instruction and Substitute Instruction 
Exemption from religiously offensive instruction should be 
granted unless government has a compelling reason for requiring 
all· children to receive the instruction. 183 Such grounds exist only 
if the exemption would leave a child without some basic knowl-
edge or skill. 184 By this standard, most requests for exemption 
should be granted. 
Must government offer religious objectors substitute instruction? 
A positive answer could be based on the principle that, even when 
government has a compelling reason for acting, it must pursue its 
end through the means least restrictive of constitutional rights. 185 
In Rust, however, the Supreme Court held that "Government can, 
without violating the Constitution, selectively fund a program to 
encourage certain activities it believes to be in the public interest, 
without at the same time funding an alternate program which seeks 
to deal with the problem in another way."186 In so doing, though, 
it cannot establish religion or impair its free exercise. For example, 
a state university cannot furnish space for use by secular groups 
while denying space for religious groups. 187 Similarly, a state that 
grants benefits to the involuntarily unemployed cannot withhold 
them from persons unemployed because of religious convic-
tions.188 
183. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 234 (1972) (holding that the state had no com-
pelling reason to require Amish children to attend high school since such children re-
ceived sufficient vocational training at home). 
184. See supra notes 72-74 and accompanying text. 
185. Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981); Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347, 
363 (1976); Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51, 59 (1973); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 
479, 488 (1960). See also NOWAK, supra note 32 at 1069 ("[I]f the state could achieve 
its goal as well by a means which would not burden the religious practice, it will be re-
quired to adopt the alternative means."). 
186. Rust v. Sullivan, Ill S. Ct. 1759, 1772 (1991). 
187. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 277 (1981). 
188. Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. !36, 146 (1987) (state's 
refusal to pay unemployment benefits to worker fired for refusal to work on Sabbath, in 
accordance with religious beliefs, violates the Free Exercise Clause); Thomas v. Review 
Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 720 (1981) (state's denial of unemployment compensation to Jehovah's 
Witness who quit defense-related employment due to religious beliefs violated Free Exer-
cise Clause); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 410 (1963) (state may not use eligibility 
requirements of unemployment compensation law "so as to constrain a worker to abandon 
his religious convictions respecting the [Sabbath]"). See also Dent, supra note 3, at 881 
n.98 (discussing Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986), in which a majority of the Su-
preme Court opined that the government could not condition receipt of Social Security 
benefits on the recipient's providing a Social Security number if so doing violated the 
recipient's religious beliefs). But cf. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990) 
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Rust also says that '"[a] legislature's decision not to subsidize 
the exercise of a fundamental right does not infringe the 
right. "'189 Thus, parents who reject all theories of evolution can-
not demand instruction in a different theory, such as creationism. 
However, claims for substitute instruction rarely seek an objective 
different from the school's. Children who request substitute readers, 
for example, accept the government's secular objective to teach 
reading and ask only that it be done without disparaging their 
religion. By contrast, the plaintiffs in Rust tried to compel the gov-
ernment to subsidize new and additional messages. 190 That is a 
different and much broader claim. 
There are constitutional limits on alternative instruction, though. 
The principle of religious neutrality forbids schools to give reli-
gious objectors a substitute that is, from a secular perspective, su-
perior to what other children get. Admittedly, this obligation poses 
hard line-drawing problems. For example, if a child objects to a 
reading program, the school can furnish an alternative reader, but 
how much time should the teacher spend with that child? If the 
answer is, no more than with each other child, the objector suffers 
from having neither group instruction nor special individual atten-
tion. That consequence seems inevitable, however, because the al-
ternative of providing special individual instruction would improp-
erly prefer that child over others. 
Some argue that the state has a compelling interest in avoiding 
the administrative burden of giving exemptions and alternative 
instruction. 191 The Supreme Court has never held that this interest 
overrides a free exercise claim. In Sherbert v. Verner, the Court 
said that to be compelling, an administrative burden must be so 
great as to render an "entire statutory scheme unworkable."192 
This view mirrors the attitude behind much recent legislation re-
(state may withhold unemployment benefits from those unemployed because of criminal 
use of drugs during religious ceremony) (discussed supra at notes 35-54 and accompany-
ing text). 
189. Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1772 (quoting Regan v. Taxation With Representation, 461 
u.s. 540, 549 (1983)). 
190. Id. (rejecting claim that Federal Government's refusal to permit abortion counseling 
in Title X funded clinics violates the First Amendment). 
191. Thus Professor Ingber fears that accommodation will leave "public education in 
shreds." Ingber, supra note 150, at 791 (quoting McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 
203, 235 (1948) (Jackson, J., concurring)). 
192. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 409 (1963). See generally Dent, supra note 3, at 
903-05. 
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quiring both public and private institutions to accommodate citizens 
with special needs, such as the disabled and non-English speaking 
students. 193 Administrative costs confer no benefit on those ac-
commodated that might influence a citizen's religious choices. Nor 
do they create an appearance of government endorsement. A more 
difficult question is whether the cost of compliance can negate an 
otherwise valid free exercise claim to accommodation. A negative 
answer could ·be premised on Supreme Court decisions that cost 
and convenience cannot justify burdens on constitutional rights. 194 
Discussion at gatherings like this symposium tends to be tech-
nical and lawyerly, but I hope that the accommodation of religious 
children will not tum into an exercise in hypertechnical line-draw-
ing. It is not in anyone's interest to litigate every detail of accom-
modation, or to monitor with a stopwatch the time a teacher 
spends on each child. If everyone acts in good faith and with 
tolerance, problems should be manageable. Recall that in Mozert 
the religious children were accommodated without incident for 
some time, until the school board stepped in and forbade any ac-
commodation.195 That attitude is unnecessarily cruel, divisive and 
insensitive to religious freedom. 
C. Group Prayer and Moments of Silence 
Requests for accommodations generally seek exemptions or 
substitute instruction, 196 but they could seek other relief, including 
accommodation for prayer. Thirty-one years ago the Supreme Court 
correctly held mandatory school prayer unconstitutional. 197 No of-
ficial school-sanctioned prayer can be neutral. No matter how it is 
193. See, e.g., Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 
327. In passing the Americans with Disabilities Act, Congress under::tood that requiring 
private and public institutions to accommodate the disabled would be costly. Senator 
Hatch, while supporting the bill, noted "this bill will prove very expensive to implement." 
136 CONG. REc. S9685 (daily ed. July 13, 1990) (statement of Sen. Hatch). Nevertheless, 
Senator Hatch was willing to incur this burden in order to bring the disabled into the 
economic mainstream. !d. Similarly, the Court is willing to sacrifice higher administrative 
costs in order to safeguard constitutional protections. 
194. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 198 (1976) (administrative ease and convenience 
insufficient to justify gender based classifications); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 149 
(1972) (cost insufficient to support state practice of charging fees for entry into primary 
election); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 633-34 (1969) ("The saving of welfare 
costs cannot justify an otherwise invidious classification."). 
195. See Brief for Petitioners at 5-6, Mozert v. Hawkins County Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 
1058 (6th Cir. 1987) (No. 87-1100), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1066 (1988). 
196. See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text. 
197. See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 424 (1962). 
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worded, any prayer will offend atheists, and some religious sects 
will inevitably object to the content of any prayer or to the very 
idea of state recitation of a prayer. Moments of silence may be 
different. Since the moment can be used for any kind of prayer, 
meditation or contemplation, or simply for relaxation, a moment of 
silence does not seem to promote religion in general or any reli-
gion in particular. Thus a moment of silence should rankle only 
those who believe that children should make noise all the time. 
It is argued, however, that in practice moments of silence pose 
the same problems as an official prayer. 198 If the teacher and 
several students pull out rosary beads or yarmulkes, other students 
will feel pressure to pray or pretend to pray, and in either case 
will feel alienated. One answer to this fear is that it is far-
fetched-it is highly unlikely that enough students will engage in 
sectarian behavior so as to pressure others to pray. A second an-
swer is that this parade of horrors is not so horrid-if several 
students do engage in distinctively sectarian behavior, the class 
may learn greater appreciation of religious pluralism. That some 
students may feel discomfort because others use the moment to 
pray is insufficient reason to forbid moments of silence. 199 
Moreover, excluding moments of silence is hardly neutral. 
School occupies children for about half of the waking day on half 
the days of the year. To preclude even a moment of silence during 
the school day sends the non-neutral message that prayer is at best 
something to keep hidden. This attitude supports the privatization 
thesis-that religion is acceptable only if it is kept out of sight, out 
of the public square. 200 It indicates that prayer should be kept 
198. See David Z. Seide, Note, Daily Moments of Silence in Public Schools: A Consti-
tutional Analysis, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 364, 406 (1983) (stating that moments of silence are 
"no different for analytical purposes than sectarian, nondenominational, or voluntary 
prayers"'). 
199. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509 (1969) 
("[T]o justify prohibition of a particular expression or opinion, [the state] must be able to 
show that its action was caused by something more than a mere desire to avoid the dis-
comfort and unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular viewpoint."'). 
200. See RicHARD J, NEUHAUS, THE NAKED PUBUC SQUARE: REUGION AND DEMOCRA-
CY IN AMERICA passim (reprinted 1991); Gerard V. Bradley, Dogmatomachy - A "Privat-
ization" Theory of the Religion Clause Cases, 30 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 275, 277 (1986) 
(asserting that decisions since Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947), are "judicial 
attempts to move religion into the realm of subjective preference by eliminating religious 
consciousness"'); Richard S. Myers, The Supreme Court and the Privatization of Religion, 
41 CATH. U. L. REV. 19, 22 (1991) (discussing the privatization thesis in the context of 
the Establishment Clause and substantive due process). Professor Myers suggests that 
privatization of religion is a theme "common in our legal discourse."' Id. at 21. 
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even more private than urination and defecation, for which schools 
at least designate private spaces. It also suggests, contrary to the 
beliefs of most religious people, that religion can and should be 
kept separate, isolated from the rest of human existence. 
Designating a moment when prayer is allowed may be not only 
permitted but mandated by the Constitution. Suppose that some 
students want a moment to pray together. To minimize disruption 
they ask the school to pick the moment. Could their request be 
denied? No one argues that a child in public school can be forbid-
den to pray alone, silently. As a corollary, if a child informs a 
teacher that she says a brief silent prayer at a particular time each 
day, the teacher could not interrupt the prayer. As the Supreme 
Court has said: "In our system, students may not be regarded as 
closed-circuit recipients of only that which the State chooses to 
communicate. They may not be confined to the expression of those 
sentiments that are officially approved."201 
The situation is no different if several students want to pray 
silently together. To permit individual prayer but not group prayer 
would deny "the associational aspects of free exercise. "202 A 
group prayer need not be so disruptive that denial would be justi-
fied as a compelling state interest. At the least, opponents of mo-
ments of silence should have to show clearly that group prayer had 
been tried and had proved disruptive; important constitutional rights 
should not be denied on the basis of unconfirmed fears.203 In 
other words, the burden should be on the state to prove a compel-
ling state interest, not on citizens to disprove it. The state need not 
pennit a moment of silence if nobody requests one. However, the 
state could and perhaps should designate such a moment voluntari-
ly.204 Otherwise, the burden is placed on religious students to 
201. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 511 (striking down a school rule forbidding the wearing of 
black armbands to show opposition to the Vietnam War). However, conduct which "mate-
rially disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others 
is, of course, not immunized by the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech." !d. at 
513. 
202. Glendon & Yanes, supra note 92, at 495-96 (asserting that the Court has ignored 
the Free Exercise Clause as it applies to groups): 
203. See Tinker, 393 U.S. at SOB (unsubstantiated fear of disruption did not justify 
school rule against wearing of armbands to protest war in Vietnam). 
204. The situation is different from that in Lee v. Weisman where the Court found that 
expecting students and parents to remain silent during an official prayer constituted a form 
of compulsion. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2658 (1992). The Court found that because the 
silence was expected during a particular prayer, the silence constituted a degree of en-
dorsement of the religious views reflected in the prayer. /d. By contrast, remaining silent 
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take the awkward step of requesting accommodation. 
Of course, moments of silence could be abused. For example, a 
teacher could encourage students during the moment of silence to 
pray to Jesus to end abortion. Public schools can discourage abuses 
by training and by punishing infractions. Courts can intervene if a 
school fails to curb abuses. Improper promotion of, or opposition 
to, religion is possible in virtually any classroom situation. A les-
son on slavery or a discussion of ethics could permit a teacher to 
praise or to criticize a particular faith or even religion in general. 
The Supreme Court has sometimes ignored this fact and selectively 
used the mere risk of promotion of religion to forbid public school 
contacts with religion.205 An approach that resolves all uncertainty 
against any contact with religion is not neutral toward religion but 
denigrates and stigmatizes it. That is not an appropriate attitude for 
a government committed to religious freedom. 
The foregoing discussion also helps to resolve the closely relat-
ed question of "symbolic links." It is often argued that moments of 
silence or equal access for religious extracurricular activities create 
or might create a perception that public schools endorse reli-
gion.206 This alleged problem is also far-fetched and in any case 
during a moment of silence does not endorse any particular religion or religion generally; 
it merely endorses the freedom of students to pray, meditate, or relax in silence. 
205. For example, the mere possibility that a teacher might improperly advance religion 
has been held sufficient to invalidate programs where public school teachers provided 
special education classes to parochial students, even though long experience with the pro-
grams disclosed not a single incident of proselytizing. Grand Rapids Sch. Dist. v. Ball, 
473 U.S. 373, 384-85 (1985). The Court reasoned that if inappropriate behavior did occur 
in a parochial school it would probably not be reported. Id. Yet, when officials monitored 
a similar program to determine whether such behavior had occurred, the Court held that 
such monitoring created excessive entanglement with religion. Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 
402, 413 (1985). In contrast to the Grand Rapids reasoning, the Court in Bowen v. Kend-
rick held that the mere possibility that grants under the Adolescent Family Life Act might 
be used improperly by recipients to promote religion did not render the statute unconstitu-
tional. Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 611-12 (1987). The Court stated that evidence 
that grants had been so used in some instances would warrant cancelling grants to those 
recipients but would not justify invalidating the entire program. Id. at 611. 
206. See Board of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 249 (1990) (petitioners argued that 
granting after-school religious groups equal access to school resources would lead an 
objective observer to believe that the school supported such religious meetings); Wallace 
v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 60 n.51 (1985) (moment of silence in public schools may indi-
rectly coerce "religious minorities to conform to the prevailing officially approved reli-
gion") (quoting Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 431 (1962)); Robett C. Boisvert, Jr., Of 
Equal Access and Trojan Horses, 3 LAW & INEQ. J. 373, 389 (1985) ("permitting reli-
gious groups to use public school facilities conveys a message of governmental endorse-
ment of religion"); Ruti Teitel, The Unconstitutionality of Equal Access Policies and Leg-
islation Allowing Organized Student-Initiated Religious Activities in the Public High 
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correctable. Students are unlikely to perceive these activities as 
endorsing religion, and public schools can help make sure of that 
by stressing their neutrality toward every faith and toward religion 
in general. Even under an equal access approach, public schools do 
not subsidize religious extracurricular activities as they do secular 
activities, such as sports and music, with expensive equipment, 
instruction and facilities. Thus, that equal access creates a percep-
tion of governmental hostility to religion is at least a plausible 
proposition. Here again, though, the fear is far-fetched and can be 
negated by disclaimers. 
D. Voucher Plans 
Under the school choice (or voucher) programs, advocated by 
many, the state would pay a fixed amount of tuition for each 
school child to attend the school of the· parents' choice, whether 
public, private nonsectarian, or parochial. Opponents call such 
programs unconstitutional because public money would be used, 
directly or indirectly, to promote religion. 207 Do choice programs 
favor religion, or merely treat it equally? The key questions here 
are context and characterization: that is, what is it that religion is 
like and with what must it be treated equally? 
To separationists, the public school is no different from the 
post office: religion has no place in either one; if you want reli-
gion, go elsewhere. This analysis breaks down if we recognize that 
the two facilities are different and that the public school represents 
a somewhat arbitrary form of subsidy. 
Education is more important than postal service, so that reli-
Schools: A Proposal for a Unitary First Amendment Forum Analysis, 12 HASTINGS 
CONST. L.Q. 529, 566-71 (1985) f'A strong preswnption of ... government endorsement 
arises when [religious) clubs are organized in public high schools."); Leah G. 
Morgenstein, Note, Board of Education of Westside Community Schools v. Mergens: 
Three "R's" + Religion = Mergens, 41 AM. U. L. REV. 221, 239 (1991) ("When reli-
gious student groups meet on school premises in a school-sponsored activity forwn, stu-
dents may not be able to discern government neutrality towards religion."); Seide, supra 
note 199, at 401-03 (arguing that moments of silence in public schools are generally per-
ceived as religiously oriented). 
207. See Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 265 (1977) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating 
that "a state subsidy of sectarian schools is invalid regardless of the form it takes [be-
cause all forms of assistance] give aid to the school's educational mission, which at heart 
is religious"). These critics of school choice are correct in saying that, if there is a prob-
lem with the direct or indirect support of religion, segregation of public funds does not 
solve this problem. Even if public money is used strictly for nonsectarian purposes, it still 
frees up private money for religious purposes and thus facilitates the parochial school's 
promotion of religion. See id. 
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gious unacceptability in public schools is more onerous than re-
ligious unacceptability in post offices. Also, primary and secondary 
public schooling has traditionally been an in kind benefit. Educa-
tional benefits do not have to take that form, however. Federal 
subsidies for higher education are in the form of either vouchers or 
cash-like grants.208 When subsidies take this form, they can be 
used at religious institutions, even "pervasively sectarian" institu-
tions, without constitutional objection.209 Prohibiting vouchers for 
primary and secondary schools is neutral only in the twisted sense 
that it maintains the status quo.210 
It does not necessarily follow that educational vouchers are 
constitutionally required or even an advisable policy. We should 
recognize, however, that using public schools as the only form of 
education subsidy imposes a heavy burden on the religious freedom 
of many Americans. This burden arises because the subsidy is 
provided in kind rather than in another form that would permit 
citizens greater choice. We should be sensitive to and willing to 
alleviate this problem if we reasonably can. 
Concededly, some money from vouchers might be used for 
purely religious activities. Such use would not necessarily be un-
constitutional. Public schools fund many extracurricular activities 
that have little or no educational value. If one school spends public 
money on extracurricular activities such as music and sports, while 
a parochial school spends the same money on religious activities, 
the state is properly neutral in funding the two schools equally. If 
expenditures per pupil are the same, no one is subsidizing 
another's religion; the state is merely funding extracurricular activi-
ties, some of which are secular and some of which are religious. 
Put another way, voucher plans of this kind are neutral in that they 
would not influence citizens to choose religious schools if they 
were not already inclined to do so. 211 
208. The Supreme Court has upheld several programs of grants that included religious 
colleges and their students. See, e.g., Witters v. Washington Dep't of Pub. Servs. for the 
Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 482 (1986) (holding that the First Amendment does not prohibit a 
state from giving tuition aid to a student preparing for the priesthood at a sectarian col-
lege); Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 737 (1976) (state grants to reli-
giously affiliated colleges); Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 749 (1973) (state revenue 
bonds); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 689 (1971) (federal construction grants). 
209. See Witters, 474 U.S. at 485-89. 
210. See Sunstein, supra note 93, at 52 (denying that neutrality is truly neutral when 
the status quo is unjust). 
211. Non-members might choose sectarian schools for nonreligious reasons, such as 
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Separationists may argue, however, that religion is different 
from , these other activities. The Religion Clauses make clear that 
the founders did consider religion different from other activities: it 
is, after all, the only activity that the government cannot establish 
and the free exercise of which the government cannot prohibit. It 
does not follow, though, that the founders intended religious activ-
ity to be treated less favorably than music and sports. So long as 
the total funding for parochial and nonsectarian schools are equal, 
religion is not favored, the state is neutral, and religious freedom is 
not violated. 
This does not mean that states must fund parochial and nonsec-
tarian schools equally. A state could, for example, decide to sub-
sidize the study of science. Although a parochial school might de-
cide for religious reasons to reject that subsidy, it cannot then 
demand a subsidy for religious activities as an alternative. The 
state's decision to subsidize the study of science is different from a 
decision to subsidize glee clubs but not religious choirs because 
there are obvious temporal reasons for the former but not for the 
latter. 
better secular education, but that choice creates no constitutional problem. Professor 
Beschle, purporting to apply a neutrality standard, opposes "full funding of religious edu-
cation" in order "[t]o guard against the possibility that a community might be deprived of 
a quality nonreligious education option." Donald L. Beschle, The Conservative as Liberal: 
The Religion Clauses, Liberal Neutrality, and the Approach of Justice O'Connor, 62 No-
TRE DAME L. REv. 151, 185 (1987). I have a hard time seeing this as a neutral position. 
This position is no more neutral than one that opposes full funding of secular education 
in order to guard against the possibility that a community might be deprived of a quality 
religious educational option. See Jernigan v. State, 412 So. 2d 1242, 1247 (Ala. Crirn. 
App. 1982) (upholding criminal conviction of Catholic parents who kept their child out of 
school because no Catholic school was available). The former position is no more persua-
sive than the latter unless one prefers secular education, which of course is not neutral. 
Professor Choper would permit aid to religious schools "to the extent that it does 
not exceed the value of [the schools'] secular services." Jesse H. Choper, The Establish-
ment Clause and Aid to Parochial Schools, 56 CAL. L. REv. 260, 340 (1968). This limi-
tation is reasonable if secular services are defined narrowly. A religiously neutral govern-
ment could decide to subsidize instruction in math, computers and American history with-
out swaying citizens' choices between religious and nonreligious schools. But Choper's 
limitation should not be constitutionally mandated. A religiously neutral government could 
decide to subsidize extracurricular activities and leave it to each school to decide whether 
those activities should be secular or religious. Again, such a program would not pressure 
citizens to choose a religious school. Indeed, the limitation should be unconstitutional if 
not narrowly defined. For example, one would have difficulty seeing why a religiously 
neutral government would fund a glee club but not a religious choir, or subsidize sports 
but not Bible studies. Such a program could influence citizens' religious choices by forc-
ing them to choose between a school with state subsidized, secular extracurricular activi-
ties (such as sports) and a school with no subsidized extracurricular activities. 
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The discussion of choice plans raises the question of whether it 
is important or even desirable to encourage children to attend pub-
lic schools by making these schools free while private schools 
receive virtually no state subsidies. By favoring secular public 
schools we disfavor schools that would teach children a richer, 
deeper body of values. This should bother even those who general-
ly applaud the liberal program for public schools. A common criti-
cism from many points of the ideological spectrum is that contem-
porary American life is bland, shallow, materialistic, self-indulgent. 
Many Americans have become Nietzsche's "last man"-people with 
no commitment to anything deeper than their own creature com-
forts.212 Perhaps that situation is not so bad. Maybe the atrocities 
perpetrated in this century by Marxist and National socialisms, by 
religious fundamentalism and by ethnic hatred, make petty self-
gratification appealing by comparison. Most of us, though, would 
like to aspire to something better. Perhaps choice plans can help 
cultivate deeper values, whether religiously or secularly based. 
One cannot say how much public schools have contributed to 
the current poverty of values. Television and radio, urbanization, 
the car and economic prosperity have also been contributing fac-
tors. It is plausible, though, that public schools have played an 
important role. If the public school program of teaching democratic 
values, and nothing more, is unsatisfactory not only to certain sects 
on religious grounds, but also to many ethnic and other groups on 
secular grounds, we should consider offering an alternative. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Our nation is committed to giving every child a free education. 
This is one of the most valuable benefits our government provides. 
Traditionally, the form of this benefit has been the free public 
school. But public schools often denigrate religion, especially tradi-
tional religions, in ways that inflict pain on many religious people. 
If our constitutional commitment to religious freedom is serious, 
we should try to accommodate these people in order to ease the 
agonizing choice between education and faith. 
212. See FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, THUS SPOKE ZARATHUSTRA 12-14 (Thomas Common 
trans. 1964). The last men "have their little pleasures" and all "wanteth the same; every 
one is equal." ld. at 13. They lack any nobility of soul and any noble aspirations. 
